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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Stern v. Marshall 1—declaring a
portion of bankruptcy judges’ statutory “core” jurisdiction to be
unconstitutionally over-broad under Article III—was akin to a jurisprudential
earthquake that is still throwing off aftershocks. 2 With its more recent
decisions in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison 3 and Wellness
International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 4 though, the Supreme Court has now
“fixed” the two most pressing and troubling potential problems raised by Stern:
(1) the supposed “statutory gap” for so-called Stern claims—statutory core
matters in which it would be unconstitutional for a non-Article III bankruptcy
judge to enter final judgment as authorized in § 157(b)(1) of the Judicial
Code, 5 and in which, therefore, bankruptcy judges (according to a few courts)
were given no statutory authorization to do anything at all (not even hear the
matter for purposes of entering proposed findings and conclusions); 6 and (2)
whether it is constitutional for a non-Article III bankruptcy judge to enter final
judgment with the consent of the litigants on non-core (and Stern) claims as
authorized by Judicial Code § 157(c)(2). 7
1

564 U.S. 462 (2011).
Stern was also like an earthquake in that the fault lines that ultimately produced its holding had been
evident (but largely ignored) ever since the 1989 decision in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33
(1989). See generally Ralph Brubaker, A “Summary” Statutory and Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy
Judges’ Core Jurisdiction After Stern v. Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121, 150–57 (2012) [hereinafter
Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory]; Ralph Brubaker, Article III’s Bleak House (Part II): The Constitutional
Limits of Bankruptcy Judges’ Core Jurisdiction, 31 BANKR. L. LETTER No. 9, Sept. 2011, at 1, 3–6 [hereinafter
Brubaker, Bleak House (Part II)].
3 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014).
4 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
5 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2012).
6 See generally Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 142–43; Ralph Brubaker, Article III’s
Bleak House (Part I): The Statutory Limits of Bankruptcy Judges’ Core Jurisdiction, 31 BANKR. L. LETTER
No. 8, Aug. 2011, at 1, 12 [hereinafter Brubaker, Bleak House (Part I)].
7 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2). See generally Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 144–45, 160–
64, 185–88; Ralph Brubaker, The Constitutionality of Litigant Consent to Non-Article III Bankruptcy
Adjudications, 32 BANKR. L. LETTER No. 12, Dec. 2012, at 1, 5–12 [hereinafter Brubaker, Litigant Consent].
2
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In Arkison, the Court plugged the purported statutory gap for Stern claims,
unanimously holding that the “statute permits Stern claims to proceed as noncore within the meaning of § 157(c).” 8 In Wellness, a more divided 6-3 Court
confirmed the constitutional validity of § 157(c)(2), holding “that Article III is
not violated when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent to
adjudication by a bankruptcy judge.” 9
Wellness is highly instructive both as to issues which it did and which it did
not expressly decide, and this article begins with an analysis of the larger
constitutional significance of the Wellness decision. For example, Wellness
clearly has implications beyond the context of non-Article III bankruptcy
adjudications with consent of the litigants; it speaks directly to the validity of
other non-Article III adjudications with litigant consent (e.g., by magistrate
judges). Part I of this article, therefore, situates the Wellness decision within
the Supreme Court’s larger jurisprudence of non-Article III adjudications. In
particular, Part I extracts from the Wellness decision helpful clues as to the
Court’s preferred methodological approach/es to determining the
constitutionality of non-Article III adjudications. Wellness fits a distinctive
pattern in the Supreme Court’s case law regarding non-Article III
adjudications, in which the Court uses formal categorical rules to determine the
8 Arkison, 134 S. Ct. at 2173. “Thus, § 157(c) may be applied naturally to Stern claims.” Id. “If the
[Stern] claim satisfies the criteria of § 157(c)(1)” because it is “related to” the debtor’s bankruptcy case, then
“the bankruptcy court simply treats the claim[] as non-core: The bankruptcy court should hear the proceeding
and submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court for de novo review and entry
of judgment.” Id. Moreover, as the Court noted in Wellness, even “when the bankruptcy court improperly
enters final judgment” on a Stern claim, on appeal district court judges “are not required to restart proceedings
entirely.” Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1942 n.6. Rather, “the district courts may [also] treat Stern claims like noncore claims,” regarding the bankruptcy court’s judgment as the equivalent of proposed findings and
conclusions that are subjected to de novo review before entry of final judgment. Id.; see Arkison, 134 S. Ct. at
2175 (holding that “even if EBIA is correct that the Bankruptcy Court’s entry of judgment was invalid, the
District Court’s de novo review and entry of its own valid final judgment cured any error”).
The Arkison Court specifically noted that the statutory process for a non-core claim—heard by a nonArticle III bankruptcy judge who submits proposed findings and conclusions for de novo review by an Article
III district court judge before entry of final judgment in the district court—“does not implicate the
constitutional defect identified by Stern.” 134 S. Ct. at 2170. Presumably, the bankruptcy court’s limited
involvement in the adjudication of such a non-core claim is constitutionally valid under the non-Article III
“adjunct” theory originating in the Court’s seminal decision of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). See
Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 158–60; Brubaker, Bleak House (Part II), supra note 2, at 6–
7.
9 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1939. The Wellness decision also held that neither the Constitution nor
§ 157(c)(2) require that such consent must be express; rather, the requisite consent can be implied if “‘the
litigant or counsel were made aware of the need for consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily
appeared to try the case’ before the non-Article III” bankruptcy judge. Id. at 1948 (quoting Roell v. Withrow,
538 U.S. 580, 590 (2003)).
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constitutionality of non-Article III adjudications without consent (e.g., over the
objection of one) of the litigants. Thus, formalism appears to be the Court’s
favored methodology for defining the scope of litigants’ constitutional right to
final judgment from an Article III judge in “any matter which, from its nature,
is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.” 10 When
the litigants have consented to the non-Article III adjudication at issue,
however, the Court uses a functional mode of analysis that assesses whether
the consent adjudication system at issue, as a practical matter, actually
threatens the structural integrity of the Article III judicial branch. These dual
modes of analysis, while seeming incoherent to many, are actually a logical
corollary of the dual interests protected by Article III, § 1—both the waivable
individual rights of litigants to an Article III adjudication, as well as nonwaivable structural separation-of-powers values.
While Part I analyzes the significance of Wellness in the Supreme Court’s
general jurisprudence of non-Article III adjudications, Parts II and III assess
Wellness’s larger implications for the constitutionality of non-Article III
bankruptcy adjudications. In particular, one of the most persistent puzzles left
unresolved by Stern is determining the constitutional basis (if any) for
bankruptcy judges to render final judgment without litigant consent, e.g., in
those statutory core matters that have traditionally been finally adjudicated by
non-Article III arbiters. 11 Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion in Wellness
ducked the broader issue of articulating the constitutional theory that validates
non-Article III bankruptcy adjudications without litigant consent. The three
“dissenting” justices, though, expressly addressed that question, 12 and it now
seems clear that a majority of the Court believes that the bulk of bankruptcy
judges’ core jurisdiction is indeed constitutionally valid. Moreover, the views
of the Wellness dissenters, as well as the Wellness decision itself, are fully
consistent with the Court’s cumulative jurisprudence of non-Article III
bankruptcy adjudications, which seems to have constitutionalized the
longstanding historical distinction between “summary” matters of estate and
10

Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856).
See generally Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 164–67, 180–85; Brubaker, Bleak
House (Part II), supra note 2, at 9–10, 16–18.
12 It is a bit curious that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas designated their separate opinions as
“dissenting” opinions, since they agreed with the majority (although for different reasons) that the judgment of
the Seventh Circuit should be reversed and remanded. See Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 1960 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Perhaps they chose the “dissenting” designation, as opposed
to concurring in part in the Court’s judgment, principally as a rhetorical device designed to register the depth
of their disagreement with the majority’s methodological approach to deciding the consent issue. See infra Part
I.B.
11
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case administration, as distinguished from “plenary” suits against “adverse
claimants.”
Part II traces the Supreme Court’s longstanding role in preserving and
defining the historical distinction between summary and plenary matters and,
most significantly, in superintending that traditional distinction (taken from
English bankruptcy practice) to limit the adjudicatory powers of non-Article III
bankruptcy referees. 13 Moreover, within the Supreme Court’s extensive
summary-plenary jurisprudence, limiting the adjudicatory powers of nonArticle III referees, is a clear precursor to the Court’s Wellness decision that
highlighted both the individual rights and structural separation-of-powers
values at stake. 14 Recognizing the summary-plenary line as the operative
constitutional boundary, therefore, is fully consistent with established
historical practice (i) that would have informed the Founders’ understanding of
the Article III, § 1 “judicial Power” in the context of bankruptcy adjudications,
and (ii) that the Supreme Court itself used to limit the adjudicatory powers of
non-Article III bankruptcy arbiters. Recognizing the summary-plenary line as
the operative constitutional boundary is also fully consistent with, and provides
a coherent and theoretically compelling explanation for, all of the Supreme
Court’s modern constitutional decisions.
Recognizing the summary-plenary line as the operative constitutional
boundary also provides lower courts with helpful guidance (from the Court’s
extensive summary-plenary jurisprudence) in making core-noncore
determinations under the current jurisdictional statute. Part III uses the
Wellness litigation to illustrate several vectors along which the Supreme Court
has differentiated between summary matters (appropriate for final adjudication
by a non-Article III bankruptcy tribunal) and plenary suits (in which the parties
have a constitutional right to final judgment from an Article III judge). Part III
demonstrates how that existing and extensive summary-plenary jurisprudence
provides a highly developed analytical framework for resolving even the most
nuanced and difficult core-noncore determinations.

13
14

See Weidhorn v. Levy, 253 U.S. 268 (1920), discussed infra Part II.A.2.
See MacDonald v. Plymouth Cty. Tr. Co., 286 U.S. 263 (1932), discussed infra Part II.B.1.
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NON-ARTICLE III CONSENT
ADJUDICATIONS—BANKRUPTCY AND NONBANKRUPTCY
Some of the Supreme Court’s modern case law regarding non-Article III
adjudications, like Stern, uses formal, categorical rules to determine the
permissibility of a particular non-Article III adjudication. Other cases, though,
like Wellness, employ a functional analysis that assesses whether the nonArticle III adjudication at issue, as a practical matter, threatens the structural
separation-of-powers values embodied in Article III, § 1. One might be
tempted to chalk up such seeming inconsistency to the vagaries of shifting
majorities navigating a difficult, controversial area of constitutional law. A
more generous explanation, though, explored and explained in this Part I, is
that the Court’s shifting majorities reflect a collective judgment that the
appropriate constitutional analysis is a bifurcated one that reconciles the dual
interests protected by Article III, § 1. 15
In the absence of litigant consent to the non-Article III adjudication at
issue, formalism preserves inviolate the litigants’ absolute right to final
judgment from an Article III judge in “any matter which, from its nature, is the
subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.” 16 When the
litigants have effectively consented to the non-Article III adjudication at issue,
though, the only constitutional values at stake are structural separation-ofpowers concerns to which the Court’s functional analysis is directly
responsive. And the pattern of the Court’s decisions, through and including
Wellness, confirms that in cases in which one of the litigants has objected to
the non-Article III adjudication at issue, the Court uses formalism to decide the
scope of a litigant’s constitutional right to an Article III adjudication, but the
Court uses a functional mode of analysis to determine the permissibility of
non-Article III adjudications done with consent of the litigants. 17 In Wellness,
that functional analysis was used to uphold the constitutionality of Judicial
Code § 157(c)(2), 18 authorizing non-Article III bankruptcy judges to finally
adjudicate Stern-like non-core claims with consent of the litigants. 19

15
16
17
18
19

See infra Part I.A.
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856).
See infra Part I.B.
28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (2012).
See infra Part I.C.
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A. Article III, § 1’s Protection of Both Individual Rights and Structural Values
The constitutional question confronting the Supreme Court in Wellness was
a deceptively difficult one: Can a non-Article III bankruptcy judge enter final
judgment in a Stern-like, traditional, private-rights suit (that would otherwise
require final judgment from an Article III district court judge) because the
parties to that suit have consented to final judgment from the bankruptcy judge
or have otherwise waived or forfeited their constitutional right to final
judgment from an Article III judge? 20 Resolving that question as a matter of
first principles of constitutional law is perplexing because of the complex
nature of Article III, § 1, which “serves both to protect ‘the role of the
independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite
government,’ and to safeguard litigants’ ‘right to have claims decided before
judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of
government.’” 21
1. A Non-Waivable Structural Protection
The Court has emphasized repeatedly in its jurisprudence of non-Article III
adjudications that Congress generally cannot “withdraw from judicial
cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the
common law, or in equity, or admiralty” 22 because of structural separation-ofpowers principles. As the Court stated in Stern, “Article III could neither serve
20 The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits had held that the litigants cannot waive an Article III, § 1
objection to entry of final judgment by a non-Article III bankruptcy judge and, indeed, could even assert such
an objection for the first time on appeal from such a final judgment. See In re BP RE, L.P., 735 F.3d 279, 286–
91 (5th Cir. 2013); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 767–73 (7th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S.
Ct. 1932 (2015); Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910, 917–18 (6th Cir. 2012). Those courts’ holdings, though,
conflicted with a contrary decision of the Ninth Circuit. See In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc., 702 F.3d 553,
566–67 (9th Cir. 2012). Those decisions also called into question the constitutionality of Judicial Code
§ 157(c)(2), which authorizes bankruptcy judges to enter final judgment in a non-core proceeding “with the
consent of all the parties to the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2); see Brubaker, Litigant Consent, supra note
7, at 1, 10. The Supreme Court, therefore, granted certiorari in the Wellness case to resolve the
constitutionality of consent adjudications by non-Article III bankruptcy courts.
The Seventh Circuit’s Wellness holding was actually limited to Stern claims in the supposed “statutory
gap” for which there was purportedly no statutory authorization in § 157(c)(2) for bankruptcy courts to enter
final judgment with consent of the litigants. See 727 F.3d at 772 (stating that “[i]n this case we need not, and
do not, express an opinion on the constitutionality of § 157(c)(2)”). See generally Brubaker, A “Summary”
Theory, supra note 2, at 145. The Arkison holding, though, that that there is no statutory gap—because “[t]he
statute permits Stern claims to proceed as non-core within the meaning of § 157(c)”—presumably means that
the § 157(c)(2) consent provision is also applicable to Stern claims. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison,
134 S. Ct. 2165, 2173 (2014).
21 CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (citations omitted and emphasis added).
22 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856).
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its purpose in the system of checks and balances nor preserve the integrity of
judicial decision making if the other branches of the Federal Government could
confer the Government’s ‘judicial Power’ on entities outside Article III.” 23
The structural dimension of Article III, § 1, therefore, would suggest that
litigant consent cannot validate final adjudication of a traditional private-rights
suit by a non-Article III bankruptcy judge. As the Supreme Court noted in
CFTC v. Schor:
[O]ur precedents establish that Article III, § 1 . . . serves as “an
inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and
balances.” Article III, § 1 safeguards the role of the Judicial Branch
in our tripartite system by barring congressional attempts “to transfer
jurisdiction [to non-Article III tribunals] for the purpose of
emasculating” constitutional courts, and thereby preventing “the
encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the
other.” To the extent that this structural principle is implicated in any
given case, the parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional
difficulty for the same reason that the parties by consent cannot
confer on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond the
limitations imposed by Article III, § 2. When these Article III
limitations are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be
dispositive because the limitations serve institutional interests that the
parties cannot be expected to protect. 24

Given the Stern Court’s heavy emphasis upon the structural protections
embodied in Article III, § 1, it is not at all surprising that Stern prompted a
serious re-examination of the constitutionality of non-Article III consent
adjudications and Judicial Code § 157(c)(2).
2. A Waivable Individual Right
The Stern decision, though, also acknowledged that “the dynamic between
and among the branches is not the only object of the Constitution’s concern,”
and in addition, “Article III protects [individual] liberty . . . by specifying the
defining characteristics of Article III judges” that ensure their independence
and impartiality. 25 Indeed, in Schor the Court went so far as to state that “our
prior discussions of Article III, § 1’s guarantee of an independent and impartial
adjudication by the federal judiciary of matters within the judicial power of the
23
24
25

Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011).
Schor, 478 U.S. at 850–51 (1986) (citations omitted).
Stern, 564 U.S. at 483 (citation omitted).
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United States intimated that this guarantee serves to protect primarily personal,
rather than structural, interests.” 26
Of course, such an individual personal right of litigants to an independent,
impartial arbiter for their dispute is a right that can be freely waived by the
litigants: “[A]s a personal right, Article III’s guarantee of an impartial and
independent federal adjudication is subject to waiver, just as are other personal
constitutional rights that dictate the procedures by which civil and criminal
matters must be tried.” 27
Determining the proper role of consent in the context of non-Article III
adjudications is conceptually difficult, then, because Article III, § 1
simultaneously protects non-waivable structural values, as well as waivable
individual rights. Thus, litigant consent or waiver clearly cannot be dispositive
in validating any and all non-Article III adjudication schemes. Consent,
however, certainly should not be entirely irrelevant if indeed Article III, § 1 is
primarily for the protection of individual litigants. In fact, as Justice Thomas
pointed out in his Wellness opinion, there are compelling indications that the
constitutional jury trial guaranties protect both litigants’ individual rights and
systemic structural interests, 28 yet the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial
is unquestionably one that can be waived by the litigants. 29
The challenge is thus sorting out the proper interaction between the
waivable personal and the non-waivable structural facets of Article III, § 1.
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit in Wellness nicely captured the nature of the
conundrum:
The dual nature of Article III, § 1, renders notions of waiver and
consent more nuanced than they are in other areas. The practical
problem, of course, is the difficulty of separating out the waivable
personal safeguard from the nonwaivable structural safeguard, for in
every case an argument that a party waived the personal protection
can be met with the argument that the court must still consider the
objection because the structural aspect cannot be waived. The net
26

Schor, 478 U.S. at 848 (emphasis added).
Id. at 848–49.
28 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1962 & n.1 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
For an excellent account of the same thesis, see SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING
THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND JURIES 11–24, 55–106
(2016).
29 See Kearney v. Case, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 275, 281 & n.6 (1870) (“Numerous decisions, however, had
settled that this right to a jury trial might be waived by the parties, and that the judgment of the court in such
cases should be valid.”).
27
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result would be that an Article III, § 1, argument can never be waived
and that parties can never consent to adjudication by a non-Article III
tribunal, which would render Schor’s discussion of the waivability of
the personal protections meaningless. 30

Moreover, (and as the Supreme Court pointed out in Wellness) that result
would also fly in the face of a long history of cases in which the Supreme
Court itself has approved non-Article III adjudications with litigant consent, 31
including two decisions specifically in the context of non-Article III
bankruptcy adjudications. 32 As I have asserted before, 33 though, a perfectly
logical means for reconciling the non-waivable structural and waivable
personal aspects of Article III, § 1 (and which the Court apparently employed
in Wellness) emerges from the seeming incongruity of the Court’s
methodological approaches in its decisions regarding the constitutionality of
non-Article III adjudications.
B. Formalism or Functionalism?
Many observers of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of non-Article III
adjudications have been frustratingly nonplused by the seeming schizophrenia
in the analytical approach of the Court’s modern decisions, beginning with
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. in 1982. 34 The
shifting mode of analysis, however, is the means by which the Court has
accommodated the two incommensurate (one waivable, one non-waivable)
constitutional interests protected by Article III, § 1.

30

Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 769 (7th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 1932.
The Court quoted my survey of that history, which revealed that “[d]uring the early years of the
Republic, federal courts, with the consent of the litigants, regularly referred adjudication of entire disputes to
non-Article III referees, masters, or arbitrators, for entry of final judgment in accordance with the referee’s
report.” Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1942 (quoting Brubaker, Litigant Consent, supra note 7, at 6).
32 See MacDonald v. Plymouth Cty. Tr. Co., 286 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1932); Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U.S.
581, 581–83 (1878); see also Brubaker, Litigant Consent, supra note 7, at 7 (discussing the significance of
those decisions).
33 See Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 186–88; Brubaker, Litigant Consent, supra note
7, at 9–10. I was also co-counsel for the American College of Bankruptcy as an amicus curiae in the Arkison
case, in which the Court granted certiorari on, but then did not decide, the consent issue resolved in Wellness.
The proper interaction between the waivable individual and non-waivable structural features of Article III, § 1
was a prominent component of the College’s amicus brief in Arkison. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the
American College of Bankruptcy in Support of Respondent at 19–22, Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison,
134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014) (No. 12-1200), 2013 WL 6091503, at *19–22, available at: http://www.
americancollegeofbankruptcy.com/file.cfm/15/docs/No.-12-1200-bsac-American-College-of-Bankruptcy.pdf.
34 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
31
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1. Marathon: Formalism
The Marathon plurality and concurring opinions used a very formal,
categorical, rule-based approach to determining the unconstitutionality of the
jurisdictional scheme of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 with respect to
the lawsuit at issue—a traditional plenary suit at law against an adverse
claimant. 35 In his dissent, though, Justice White advocated abandoning formal
limits on Congress’s power to create non-Article III tribunals and proposed
instead a more pragmatic, functional approach to ascertaining the
constitutionality of any given system of non-Article III adjudications—one that
balances “the strength of the legislative interest” in employing a non-Article III
tribunal against “the values furthered by Art. III”:
I do not suggest that the Court should simply look to the strength
of the legislative interest and ask itself if that interest is more
compelling than the values furthered by Art. III. The inquiry should,
rather, focus equally on those Art. III values and ask whether and to
what extent the legislative scheme accommodates them or,
conversely, substantially undermines them. The burden on Art. III
values should then be measured against the values Congress hopes to
serve through the use of Art. I courts. 36

And Justice White’s functional approach soon gained seeming ascendance.
2. Schor, Thomas, and Peretz: Functionalism
In a series of subsequent decisions regarding non-Article III
adjudications—Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products, 37 CFTC v.
Schor, 38 and Peretz v. United States 39—the Court not only upheld the particular
non-Article III adjudication at issue in each case, but the Court also appeared
to adopt precisely the kind of functional balancing approach Justice White had
proposed in his Marathon dissent. 40 Stern, though, brought an abrupt and (for
35 “[T]he lawsuit in which Marathon was named defendant seeks damages for breach of contract,
misrepresentation, and other counts which are the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the
courts at Westminster in 1789.” Marathon, 458 U.S. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
36 Id. at 115 (White, J., dissenting).
37 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
38 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
39 501 U.S. 923 (1991).
40 Indeed, this prompted Dean Chemerinsky to opine that the Marathon decision itself was perhaps ripe
for an outright overruling, stating that although “[t]here is . . . an unpredictability to the Court’s balancing
approach, since it is not clear what weight the Court will give to what factors in the balancing,” nonetheless,
“if Northern Pipeline were decided today, there is every reason to believe that it would be resolved differently.
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many) surprising resurrection of formalism in the jurisprudence of non-Article
III adjudications. 41
3. Stern: Formalism
The Stern v. Marshall dissenters would have upheld the constitutionality of
Judicial Code § 157(b)(2)(C) 42 using a “more pragmatic approach to the
constitutional question” that considers a number of relevant factors “to
determine pragmatically whether a congressional delegation of adjudicatory
authority to a non-Article III judge violates the separation-of-powers principles
inherent in Article III.” 43 That approach, of course, is consistent with Justice
White’s Marathon dissent and the Court’s opinions in Thomas, Schor, and
Peretz.
The Stern majority, however, would have none of that. Indeed, Justice
Scalia not only joined the majority opinion’s formal constitutional limit on
bankruptcy judges’ core jurisdiction, but also separately concurred to, inter
alia, deride the dissent’s “intuitive balancing of benefits and harms” as an
inappropriate method of constitutional adjudication. 44 With the Wellness
decision, though, we see the (mysterious?) reappearance of functionalism.
4. Wellness: Functionalism
The resurgence of formalism in Stern, more than anything else, likely
explains the rash of lower-court decisions holding consent adjudications by
bankruptcy judges to be unconstitutional. 45 The kind of pragmatic functional
analysis necessary to accommodate consent adjudications (and that the
The approach endorsed in Schor indicates a strong likelihood that Justice White’s opinion might attract a
majority of the Court.” Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Marathon: It Is Time to Overrule Northern Pipeline,
65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 320 (1991).
41 Dean Chemerinsky was particularly critical of the Stern majority’s reliance on formalism. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, Formalism Without a Foundation: Stern v. Marshall, 2011 S. CT. REV. 183.
The Court’s Granfinanciera decision also used formal categorical rules in explicating the scope of the
constitutional right to final judgment from an Article III judge. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S.
33 (1989); infra notes 117–123 and accompanying text. Until Stern, though, most observers discounted the
relevance of Granfianciera to Article III jurisprudence. See generally Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra
note 2, at 150–51.
42 At least as applied to a non-Article III bankruptcy judge’s final adjudication of compulsory
“counterclaims by [a debtor’s bankruptcy] estate against persons filing claims against the estate.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(C) (2012).
43 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 512–13 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 505 (Scalia, J., concurring).
45 See supra note 20.
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majority utilized in Wellness) “has no place in the Stern majority’s formalistic
approach to Article III.” 46 Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia
dissented in Wellness because they “would not yield so fully to functionalism.
The Framers adopted the formal protections of Article III for good reasons, and
‘the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in
facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is
contrary to the Constitution.’” 47 For Roberts and Scalia, then, the formal
analysis was straightforward and simple: “Sharif has no authority to
compromise the structural separation of powers or agree to an exercise of
judicial power outside Article III. His consent therefore cannot cure a
constitutional violation.” 48
Why the “flip flop” on methodology, then, for those Justices (Alito and
Kennedy) who joined the majority opinions in both Stern (formalism) and
Wellness (functionalism)? I would suggest that the explanation is rooted in the
dual nature of Article III, § 1 in safeguarding both non-waivable structural
interests and waivable personal liberty interests.
5. Formalism as a Protection of Individual Liberty Interests
As the Wellness majority emphasized, in each of the prominent modern-era
decisions using a formal categorical analysis (Marathon and Stern), the Court
struck down a non-Article III adjudication to which one of the litigants
objected. 49 And in each case, the Court’s decision expressly relied upon the
absence of litigant consent in finding the non-Article III adjudication to be
unconstitutional. 50 Indeed, in the Marathon case, all of the opinions (plurality,
concurrence, and two dissents) made a point of emphasizing that the holding of
the Court applied only in the absence of litigant consent to final judgment from
a non-Article III bankruptcy judge. 51

46 Kent L. Richland, Stern v. Marshall: A Dead-End Marathon?, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 393, 415
(2012); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 209–12.
47 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1950 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)).
48 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1954 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
49 “[T]he cases in which this Court has found a violation of a litigant’s right to an Article III
decisionmaker have involved an objecting defendant forced to litigate involuntarily before a non-Article III
court.” Id. at 1947 (Sotomayor, J., for the Court).
50 See Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 160–64.
51 See Brubaker, Litigant Consent, supra note 7, at 7–8.
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In the absence of consent, the Court’s formal, categorical approach to the
Article III, § 1 protection serves as a strong-form bulwark to preserve inviolate
individual litigants’ personal right to final adjudication from an independent
Article III court in “any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at
the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.” 52 Indeed, “the litigants’ personal
interests in an arbiter who is (actually and, as importantly, widely perceived to
be) independent and impartial . . . is not a concern to which functional
balancing (in the absence of litigant consent) is particularly (if at all)
sensitive.” 53 The personal liberty interest at stake when a litigant objects to a
particular non-Article III adjudication, therefore, helps explain why a majority
of the Court would consistently favor formalism as the appropriate means of
explicating the constitutional right in that circumstance.
6. Functionalism as a Structural Evaluation of Non-Article III Consent
Adjudications
By contrast, where the parties to a particular controversy have effectively
consented to a non-Article III adjudication, that consent removes any concern
for the litigants’ personal right to an Article III adjudication. Thus, it is only
Article III, § 1’s structural protections that are at stake in non-Article III
consent adjudications, and it is precisely those structural concerns to which
“functional balancing seems most attuned and responsive.” 54 Indeed, in nonArticle III adjudication cases in which the Court has used a more pragmatic,
functional analysis (in each case, to uphold the non-Article III adjudication at
issue), the litigants had consented in some fashion to the non-Article III
adjudication at issue. 55 As Justice Alito pointed out in his separate Wellness
concurrence, those decisions are “still the law of this Court.” 56
52

Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856).
Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 188.
54 Id.
55 “The Court has never done what Sharif and the principal dissent would have us do—hold that a litigant
who has the right to an Article III court may not waive that right through his consent.” Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at
1947 (emphasis added). For example, in Peretz the defendant’s consent “was dispositive” in validating the
non-Article III practice at issue. Id. at 1943. Compare Peretz v. U.S., 501 U.S. 923, 935–36 (1991) (holding
that non-Article III magistrate judge could supervise voir dire in a felony trial with defendant’s consent), with
Gomez v. U.S., 490 U.S. 858, 872 (1989) (holding that non-Article III magistrate judges have no such power
without consent because of, inter alia, constitutional concerns). See also CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 849
(1986) (emphasizing that “Schor indisputably waived any right he may have possessed to full trial” of the
claim at issue “before an Article III court”); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589–
92 (1985) (emphasizing that the agency adjudication at issue governed only “voluntary participants” in “a
complex regulatory scheme to allocate costs and benefits” of the program amongst those “voluntary
participants,” that “no unwilling defendant is subjected to judicial enforcement as a result of the agency
53
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7. Consent Does Not Cure a Constitutional Violation, Consent Changes the
Constitutional Analysis
But what about Chief Justice Roberts’ contention that neither the litigants
nor the Article III courts themselves can “agree to an exercise of judicial power
outside Article III,” and “consent therefore cannot cure a constitutional
violation”? 57 Indeed, on the surface, that very result seems to be the upshot of
the Wellness holding. If the suit at issue is a traditional plenary private-rights
suit against an adverse claimant, both Marathon and Stern hold that a finaljudgment adjudication of that suit by a non-Article III bankruptcy court
violates Article III. Wellness, however, “holds that Article III permits
bankruptcy courts to decide [such suits] submitted to them by consent” of the
litigants; 58 i.e., consent seemingly “cures” the constitutional violation.
Bifurcating Article III, § 1’s protections in the manner outlined above,
though, 59 reveals that Chief Justice Roberts’ invocation of the “consent cannot
cure a constitutional violation” maxim is based upon contested assumptions
that the Wellness majority apparently did not accept.
If the formal categorical prohibition set forth in Marathon and Stern serves
to protect individual litigants’ personal right to final judgment from an Article
III judge, then absence of a waiver of that right (i.e., absence of litigant consent
to a non-Article III adjudication) is essential to the constitutional violation
identified in Marathon and Stern. As the Court stated in Thomas, “[t]he
Court’s holding in [Marathon] establishes only that Congress may not vest in a
non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue
binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under state law, without
consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate review.” 60
Indeed, after quoting that same passage in his Stern opinion, Chief Justice
Roberts said, “Just so: Substitute ‘tort’ for ‘contract,’ and that statement
directly covers this case.” 61

‘adjudication,’” and that “the only potential object of judicial enforcement power is the” participant “who
explicitly consents to have his rights determined by arbitration”).
56 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1949 (Alito, J., concurring). “If, as the principal dissent suggests, consent is
irrelevant to the Article III analysis, it is difficult to see how Schor and Peretz were not wrongly decided. But
those decisions obviously remain good law.” Id. at 1947 (Sotomayor, J., for the Court); see Brubaker, Litigant
Consent, supra note 7, at 9.
57 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1954 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 1949 (Sotomayor, J., for the Court) (emphasis added).
59 See supra Part I.B.5–6.
60 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 584 (emphasis added).
61 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 494 (2011).
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Justice Thomas made this very point in his separate dissent in Wellness in
order to explain his view that appropriate historical evidence could reveal that
“parties may consent to bankruptcy court adjudication of” Marathon- and
Stern-like plenary suits 62:
[B]ecause the only authorities capable of granting power are the
Constitution itself, and the people acting through the amendment
process, individual consent cannot authorize the Government to
exceed constitutional boundaries.
This does not mean, however, that consent is invariably
irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry. Although it may not authorize
a constitutional violation, consent may prevent one from occurring in
the first place. This concept is perhaps best understood with the
example on which the majority and THE CHIEF JUSTICE both rely: the
right to a jury trial.1 [Footnote 1: There is some dispute whether the
guarantee of a jury trial protects an individual right, a structural right,
or both, raising serious questions about how it should be treated
under Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor. My view,
which does not turn on such taxonomies, leaves no doubt: It is a
“fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure,”
meaning its violation may not be authorized by the consent of the
individual.] Although the Government incurably contravenes the
Constitution when it acts in violation of the jury trial right, our
precedents permit the Government to convict a criminal defendant
without a jury trial when he waives that right. The defendant’s waiver
is thus a form of consent that lifts a limitation on government action
by satisfying its terms—that is, the right is exercised and honored,
not disregarded. Provided the Government otherwise acts within its
powers, there is no constitutional violation. 63

With respect to non-Article III adjudications with litigant consent, then,
consent lifts the Marathon/Stern formal categorical prohibition designed to
protect individual litigants’ personal right to final judgment from an Article III
judge in a traditional private-rights suit. Hence, whether that consent

62

Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1970 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (opining that “[w]hether parties may consent to
bankruptcy court adjudication of Stern claims is a difficult constitutional question” that “turns on issues that
are not adequately considered by the Court or briefed by the parties”). See infra note 67 and note 248 and
accompanying text for my analysis of (and response to) Justice Thomas’s insistence upon additional historical
evidence.
63 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1961–62 & n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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adjudication “otherwise” violates the Constitution depends upon whether it
contravenes Article III structural separation-of-powers values. 64
a. Divisibility of the Personal and Structural Interests
Of course, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia also favored formalism
as the appropriate means of operationalizing Article III, § 1’s structural
protections, using the same categorical rules that define the content of
individuals’ personal right to final judgment from an Article III judge. For
Roberts and Scalia, then, Article III, § 1’s individual and structural dimensions
are inseparable, 65 and thus, litigant consent can have no effect. 66 According to
Chief Justice Roberts, because Stern establishes the content of the
constitutional guaranty for purposes of both individual and structural interests,
“Stern held that ‘it does not matter who’ authorizes a bankruptcy judge to
render final judgment on Stern claims, because the ‘constitutional bar
remains.’” 67
The biggest embarrassment for that position, though, is a long series of
decisions in which the Supreme Court specifically approved non-Article III
adjudications with litigant consent:
During the early years of the Republic, federal courts, with
consent of the litigants, regularly referred adjudication of entire
disputes to non-Article III referees, masters, or arbitrators, for entry
of final judgment in accordance with the referee’s report. The
Supreme Court, in reviewing challenges to such judgments, implicitly
approved these non-Article III adjudications, consulting prior
practices of English courts and the contemporaneous practice in the
state courts. As Mr. Justice Campbell stated for the Court, in
affirming such a judgment pursuant to the “practice [that] prevails in
64

See Jaime Dodge, Reconceptualizing Non-Article III Tribunals, 99 MINN. L. REV. 905, 947 (2015) (“If
the individual is merely waiving his own right, then the court retains the jurisdiction to assess any structural
challenge to the non-Article III tribunal.”).
65 See Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1956–57 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492
U.S. 33, 70 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
66 As Justice Brennan stated in dissent in Schor, “[b]ecause the individual and structural interests served
by Article III are coextensive, I do not believe that a litigant may ever waive his right to an Article III tribunal
where one is constitutionally required. In other words, consent is irrelevant to Article III analysis.” CFTC v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 867 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1957 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Thomas, while
allowing for bifurcation of the individual and structural analysis, would also analyze the structural values at
stake using formalism, grounded in an extremely specific inquiry into historical practice—one that virtually
ensures an absence of relevant historical evidence, at least in the context of bankruptcy adjudications. See
supra note 62 and accompanying text; infra note 248 and accompanying text.
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the courts, where rules of reference are in use,” “upon principle we
see no objection to the introduction of the same practice in the courts
of the United States.” Moreover, when eventually the practice was
directly challenged as improper, the Supreme Court upheld it as fully
consistent with the judicial function of the federal courts. 68

Chief Justice Roberts would have accommodated/distinguished these
decisions on the basis that “[i]n those cases, . . . it was the Article III court that
ultimately entered final judgment.” 69 “The problem is that Congress has . . .
given bankruptcy courts authority to enter final judgments subject only to
deferential appellate review, and Article III precludes those judgments when
they involve Stern claims.” 70 “[U]nder the Constitution, the ‘ultimate
responsibility for deciding’ the case must remain with the Article III court.” 71
Chief Justice Roberts fails to mention, however, that non-Article III
bankruptcy referees under the 1898 Act system did enter final orders and
judgments with consent of the litigants, 72 and the Supreme Court upheld that
practice (with specific reference to principles of constitutional structure) in
MacDonald v. Plymouth County Trust Co. 73 Moreover, even in the 19th
century cases Roberts was distinguishing, the referees’ reports were binding on
the Article III court, with the same effect as a final judgment—only reversible
under a deferential standard similar to appellate review. 74
All that was at stake, therefore, with the formal line Chief Justice Roberts
was proposing was who performs the entirely formal act of entering the
judgment in non-Article III consent adjudications—either a non-Article III
bankruptcy court (with deferential appellate review thereof by an Article III
district court) or an Article III district court (based upon a deferential

68 Brubaker, Litigant Consent, supra note 7, at 6 (footnotes omitted) (quoting York & Cumberland R.R.
Co. v. Myers, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 246, 252 (1855)).
69 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1958 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 1957 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 1958 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
72 See 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 39.01[5], 39.16, 39.28 (James Wm. Moore et al. eds., 14th ed.
1978) [hereinafter COLLIER (14th ed.)].
73 286 U.S. 263, 267 (1932); see infra Part II.B.1.b.
74 See, e.g., Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 524 (1889) (holding that the master’s “findings, like those
of an independent tribunal, are to be taken as presumptively correct,” subject to revision only “when there has
been a manifest error in the consideration given to the evidence, or in the application of the law, but not
otherwise”); Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U.S. 581, 583 (1878) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to de
novo review of the referees’ report in the district court because the parties’ “agreement to submit the
controversy to referees” indicated “clearly that they intended the [referees’] award should be final and
conclusive”).
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appellate-like review of the non-Article III bankruptcy court’s report). Indeed,
in the latter case (on which Roberts would insist with his view that the former
is unconstitutional), the Article III judge need not have any involvement at all
prior to entry of judgment, as the Court in Heckers v. Fowler approved a
judgment entered under an order of reference that expressly provided “that on
filing the report of the said referee with the clerk of the court, judgment be
entered in conformity therewith the same as if said cause had been heard
before the court.” 75
Drawing such an extremely fine line, supposedly for the sake of protecting
the institutional integrity of the Article III courts, seems a bit silly and, indeed,
might well permit greater encroachments than a practical functional evaluation
of the consent adjudication system at issue. A majority of the Court in
Wellness, therefore, was unwilling to extend Stern’s formal prohibition to
consent adjudications. Justice Alito, in particular (who joined the Stern
majority opinion—a case where the defendant objected to final judgment from
the non-Article III bankruptcy judge) specifically mentioned this particular
implication of extending formalism to consent adjudications in his Wellness
concurrence, using the non-Article III consent-adjudication example of arbitral
awards:
No one believes that an arbitrator exercises “[t]he judicial Power of
the United States,” Art. III, § 1, in an ordinary, run-of-the mill
arbitration. And whatever differences there may be between an
arbitrator’s “decision” and a bankruptcy court’s “judgment,” those
differences would seem to fall within the Court’s previous rejection
[in Schor] of “formalistic and unbending rules.” 76

The majority’s response to Chief Justice Roberts’ proposed formalism,
therefore, was that formalism is not the appropriate mode of constitutional
analysis when litigants have consented to the non-Article III adjudication at
issue: “[W]e do not rely on [defendant] Sharif’s consent to ‘cur[e]’ a violation
of Article III. His consent shows, in part, why no such violation has
occurred.” 77

75
76
77

69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 127 (1864).
Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1949 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1945 n.10 (Sotomayor, J., for the Court).
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b. Consent Changes the Constitutional Analysis
Consent, then, seems to be the determinative circumstance justifying (for a
majority of the Court) a functional analysis of the propriety of the non-Article
III consent adjudication scheme at issue. As the Court stated in Peretz,
“consent significantly changes the constitutional analysis” 78 and effectively
functions as a “switching device” that “channels the rest of the analysis.” 79
Thus, the Wellness Court concluded that if the parties have effectively
consented to the non-Article III adjudication at issue, then the constitutionality
of that particular kind of consent adjudication is determined using a functional
analysis of whether it does, as a practical matter, pose a realistic threat to the
structural values embedded in Article III, § 1:
The question here, then, is whether allowing bankruptcy courts
to decide Stern claims by consent would “impermissibly threate[n]
the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.” And that question
must be decided not by “formalistic and unbending rules,” but “with
an eye to the practical effect that the” practice “will have on the
constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.” “[P]ractical
attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal
categories should inform application of Article III.” 80

And the Court’s practical, functional assessment of Judicial Code
§ 157(c)(2) led it to conclude that consent adjudications by non-Article III
bankruptcy judges do not pose any realistic threat to the structural soundness
of the Article III judiciary.
C. Consent Adjudications by Bankruptcy Courts Do Not Impermissibly
Threaten the Institutional Integrity of the Judicial Branch
Unsurprisingly, the Wellness Court upheld the constitutionality of Judicial
Code § 157(c)(2). Two overarching structural considerations point to that
result. First, “as a practical matter, structural separation-of-powers
concerns . . . do not pose any significant threat to the independence and
impartiality of non-Article III bankruptcy judges, as the system is currently
structured.” 81 Second, “there is no indication that Congress gave bankruptcy
78

Peretz v. U.S., 501 U.S. 923, 932 (1991), quoted in Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1943.
LARRY YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: THE CURRENT QUESTIONS (forthcoming Dec. 2016) (noting that
“[b]y this account, personal consent should function as a switching device” and citing the American College of
Bankruptcy amicus brief in Arkison discussed supra note 33).
80 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1944 (citations omitted).
81 Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 187.
79
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courts the ability to decide Stern[-like non-core] claims [with litigant consent]
in an effort to aggrandize itself or humble the Judiciary.” 82
1. The Article III Courts’ Control of Bankruptcy Judges’ Consent
Adjudications
In its functional analysis of the constitutionality of Judicial Code
§ 157(c)(2), the Wellness Court indicated that the principal consideration is the
level of control the Article III judiciary exercises over the consent
adjudications at issue. Such a system of non-Article III consent adjudications
“does not offend the separation of powers so long as Article III courts retain
supervisory authority over the process.” 83
Bankruptcy judges’ adjudicatory role in non-core proceedings was modeled
after that of the non-Article III magistrate judges in civil suits in the federal
district courts. Accordingly, the consent provision of § 157(c)(2) was also
modeled after the consent provision of the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979. 84
And the Wellness Court concluded that Article III judges’ control over consent
adjudications by bankruptcy judges is sufficiently robust “that allowing
bankruptcy litigants to waive the right to Article III adjudication of Stern[-like
non-core] claims does not usurp the constitutional prerogatives of Article III
courts.” 85
Bankruptcy judges, like magistrate judges, “are appointed and subject
to removal by Article III judges,” Peretz, 501 U.S., at 937; see 28
U.S.C. §§ 152(a)(1), (e). They “serve as judicial officers of the
United States district court,” § 151, and collectively “constitute a unit
of the district court” for that district, § 152(a)(1). Just as “[t]he
‘ultimate decision’ whether to invoke [a] magistrate [judge]’s
assistance is made by the district court,” Peretz, 501 U.S., at 937,
bankruptcy courts hear matters solely on a district court’s reference,
§ 157(a), which the district court may withdraw sua sponte or at the
request of a party, § 157(d). . . . As in Peretz, “[b]ecause ‘the entire
process takes place under the district court’s total control and
jurisdiction,’ there is no danger that use of the [bankruptcy court]
82

Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1945.
Id. at 1944; see also id. at 1946 (“So long as those [non-Article III] judges are subject to control by the
Article III courts, their work poses no threat to the separation of powers.”).
84 That statute provides that a non-Article III magistrate judge, “[u]pon consent of the parties . . . may
conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case,”
subject to appeal “in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of a district court.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c)(1) & (3) (2012).
85 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1944–45.
83
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involves a ‘congressional attemp[t] “to transfer jurisdiction [to nonArticle III tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating” constitutional
courts.’” 501 U.S., at 937 (citation omitted). 86

The holding of Wellness, therefore, not only upholds the constitutionality
of Judicial Code § 157(c)(2), its rationale leaves little to no doubt that the
consent provision of the Federal Magistrate Act, Judicial Code § 636(c), is also
constitutional. Indeed, the Court specifically noted that “the Courts of Appeals
have unanimously upheld the constitutionality of § 636(c)” and that those
decisions are “[c]onsistent with [the Court’s] precedents.” 87
2. Bankruptcy Judges’ Authority to Render Final and Proposed Judgments
Without Litigant Consent
Also material to the Court’s functional analysis of Judicial Code
§ 157(c)(2) was the apparent agreement by a majority of the Court (explored in
Part II of this article) that, with the exception of Stern claims, bankruptcy
judges’ authority to render final judgment in “core” bankruptcy proceedings 88
is indeed constitutionally valid, even without litigant consent. Given that, it
was only with respect to Stern-like non-core “related to” claims 89 that the
validity of litigant consent to final judgment from a bankruptcy judge was even
at issue in Wellness.
Whatever “potential prejudicial influences on bankruptcy judges’
decisions” may exist, “those potential prejudices (and even speculative
hypothetical incursions from other political branches) seem to be just as (if not
more) potent in proceedings in which bankruptcy judges can . . .
unquestionably render final judgment (such as adjudicating creditors’ claims),

86

Id. at 1945; accord Brubaker, Litigant Consent, supra note 7, at 10. Although not expressly mentioned
by the Court, it also seems likely that the right to appeal any final judgment entered by a non-Article III
bankruptcy or magistrate judge, to an Article III appellate court, is an essential aspect of Article III courts’
control over these non-Article III consent adjudications and thus the constitutionality thereof. See Ralph
Brubaker, Bankruptcy Appeals: Finality and the Appellate Litigation Unit, 35 BANKR. L. LETTER No. 6, June
2015, at 1, 3 & n.13. In the absence of litigant consent to final judgment by a non-Article III bankruptcy or
magistrate judge, sufficient control of these non-Article III judicial officers (under the “adjunct” theory of
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)) may well require de novo review in an Article III court. See supra note
8. But “to the extent ‘de novo review is required to satisfy Article III concerns, it need not be exercised unless
requested by the parties.’” Peretz v. U.S., 501 U.S. 923, 939 (1991) (citation omitted).
87 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1948 n.12; see also id. at 1944 n.9 (noting that Peretz expressly opined that
§ 636(c) is constitutional).
88 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2012).
89 See id. § 157(c); supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
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as they are in non-core ‘related to’ proceedings.” 90 As I previously maintained,
then, as a practical matter, “litigant consent to final judgment from bankruptcy
judges in non-core proceedings, in and of itself, poses a truly inconsequential
marginal threat to the structural integrity of the bankruptcy system.” 91 The
Wellness Court reached a similar conclusion:
[B]ankruptcy courts possess no free-floating authority to decide
claims traditionally heard by Article III courts [with consent of the
litigants]. Their ability to resolve such matters [with litigant consent]
is limited to “a narrow class of [non-core] common law claims as an
incident to the [bankruptcy courts’] primary, and unchallenged,
adjudicative function [in core proceedings].” “In such circumstances,
the magnitude of any intrusion on the Judicial Branch can only be
termed de minimis.” 92

Moreover, the bankruptcy courts’ “primary and unchallenged adjudicative
function” (to which their non-core consent adjudications are incident) is not
limited to their final-judgment jurisdiction in core matters; it also includes their
significant role in non-core “related to” proceedings, even without consent of
the litigants, that the Court upheld in Arkison. 93 Bankruptcy judges can, and
routinely do, fully hear (including by bench trial) Stern-like non-core “related
to” claims and submit proposed judgments thereon (in the form of proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law) to their Article III district courts. 94 The
unanimous Arkison Court specifically noted that this statutory process for noncore claims—with de novo review by an Article III district court judge before
entry of final judgment in the district court—“does not implicate the
constitutional defect identified by Stern.” 95 “The option for parties to submit
their” non-core “related to” claims for final (rather than merely a proposed)
judgment by a bankruptcy judge is also “at most a ‘de minimis’ infringement
on the prerogative of the federal courts,” 96 given the Article III courts’
extensive control over such consent adjudications:
Congress could choose to rest the full share of the Judiciary’s
labor on the shoulders of Article III judges. But doing so would
require a substantial increase in the number of district judgeships.

90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Brubaker, Litigant Consent, supra note 7, at 10.
Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 188.
Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1945 (citations omitted).
Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014).
See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1); supra note 8.
Arkison, 134 S. Ct. at 2170.
Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1943 (citation omitted).
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Instead, Congress has supplemented the capacity of district courts
through the able assistance of bankruptcy judges. So long as those
judges are subject to control by the Article III courts, their work
poses no threat to the separation of powers. 97

Indeed, even the Wellness dissenters acknowledged that, as the system is
currently structured, consent adjudications by bankruptcy judges “seem benign
enough,” and “litigants can be trusted to protect their own interests when
deciding whether to consent.” 98 Moreover, if Congress were to change the
structure of the bankruptcy court system in deleterious ways, as the dissenters
fear is (if not at all probable) at least possible, 99 that alternative system of nonArticle III consent adjudications would not necessarily pass constitutional
muster. One would hope that the chief virtue in a flexible functional
assessment of consent adjudication structures would be that it is directly
responsive to genuine congressional “effort[s] to aggrandize itself or humble
the Judiciary.” 100
For example, systematic efforts to “coerce” litigant “consent” 101 could both
undermine litigants’ personal liberty interests protected by Article III, § 1 and
indicate a serious (to the extent of even wholesale) compromise of Article III
judges’ institutional role in non-core suits. Final judgment from a non-Article
III bankruptcy judge in a non-core suit, in the absence of the litigants’ knowing
and voluntary consent to that adjudication, runs afoul of the Marathon/Stern
formal, categorical rule preserving inviolate litigants’ individual right to final
judgment from an Article III judge and, thus, removes the entire premise for a
functional structural assessment of the validity of the consent adjudication
system. Credible indications of systemic “coercion” of litigant “consent,”
therefore, should be subjected to particularly searching scrutiny and might
even run afoul of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions (placed on the
litigants’ right to final judgment from an Article III judge). 102

97 Id. at 1946. In the absence of litigant consent, that control is even more extensive and is essential to
ensuring that the bankruptcy judge is a true “adjunct” to the Article III district court, under the theory of
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). See supra notes 8 and 86.
98 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1959 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
99 See id. at 1959–60 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 1945 (Sotomayor, J., for the Court).
101 See generally Dodge, supra note 64, at 936–48.
102 The particular example Chief Justice Roberts gave in his parade of horribles potentially following on
the heels of Wellness—“Congress can find ways to ‘encourage’ consent, say by requiring it as a condition of
federal benefits”—would seem to be extremely suspect on this basis. Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1960 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting); cf. Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 163.
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NON-ARTICLE III BANKRUPTCY
ADJUDICATIONS—WITH AND WITHOUT LITIGANT CONSENT
While Part I of this article situates the Wellness decision within the
Supreme Court’s larger jurisprudence of non-Article III adjudications, this Part
II reconciles Wellness with the Court’s decisions in the particular context of
non-Article III bankruptcy adjudications, both with and without litigant
consent. The precise holding of Wellness only addressed the constitutionality
of consent adjudications by non-Article III bankruptcy judges. Wellness,
though, is also instructive with respect to an important issue left unresolved by
Stern: determining the constitutional basis (if any) for bankruptcy judges to
render final judgment without litigant consent in those statutory “core” matters
that traditionally have been finally adjudicated by non-Article III arbiters. 103
This Part II, therefore, explores what Wellness adds to the search for the
constitutional line between (1) those matters in which bankruptcy judges can
render final judgment, even without litigant consent, and (2) those matters in
which litigants have a constitutional right to final judgment from an Article III
judge.
The petitioners in Wellness argued forcefully that the suit at issue was not
one in which the litigants had a constitutional right to final judgment from an
Article III judge. Because the Wellness consent holding was potentially
dispositive, though, 104 Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion did not address
whether the suit at issue was indeed one in which the litigants had a
constitutional right to final judgment from an Article III judge. Sotomayor’s
majority opinion thus ducked the broader issue of articulating the
constitutional theory that validates non-Article III bankruptcy adjudications
without litigant consent. 105 The three dissenting justices, though, explicitly
addressed that question and concluded that “Article III likely poses no barrier
to the Bankruptcy Court’s resolution of Wellness’s claim,” even without the

103 See generally Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 164–67, 180–85; Brubaker, Bleak
House (Part II), supra note 2, at 9–10, 16–18.
104 And on remand, the Wellness consent holding was dispositive. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v.
Sharif, 617 Fed. Appx. 589, 590–91 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that appellant had forfeited his claim to a
constitutional right to final judgment from an Article III judge by failure to timely raise that argument in his
appeal).
105 “Because the Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court could validly enter judgment on Wellness’
claim with the parties’ consent, this opinion does not address, and expresses no view on, Wellness’ alternative
contention that the Seventh Circuit erred in concluding the claim [at issue] was a Stern[-like non-core] claim.”
Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1942 n.7.
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litigants’ consent, because it “falls within the narrow historical exception that
permits a non-Article III adjudicator in certain bankruptcy proceedings.” 106
Consequently, it now seems clear that a majority of the Court believes that
the bulk of bankruptcy judges’ core jurisdiction—authorizing bankruptcy
judges to enter final judgment without litigant consent 107—is indeed
constitutionally valid. Moreover, the views of the Wellness dissenters, as well
as the Wellness decision itself (regarding consent adjudications), are fully
consistent with the Court’s cumulative jurisprudence of non-Article III
bankruptcy adjudications, which seems to have constitutionalized the historical
distinction (imported from English bankruptcy practice prevailing at the time
of the Founding) between summary bankruptcy matters and plenary suits at
law or in equity.
As regards the constitutionality of non-Article III bankruptcy adjudications
without litigant consent, the Court has been cryptic and cagey—purposefully
avoiding any clear, definitive statement confirming the constitutional validity
of (and basis for) non-Article III bankruptcy adjudications. 108 Nonetheless,
there is considerable evidence that the entire series of constitutional decisions
from Marathon 109 to Granfinanciera 110 to Stern 111 to Wellness has simply
confirmed the constitutional significance of the longstanding, fundamental,
historical distinction between (i) summary matters of estate and case
administration, appropriate for final adjudication by a non-Article III arbiter, as
distinguished from (ii) plenary suits by the bankruptcy estate’s representative
to recover money or property from an adverse claimant, in which individual
litigants have a constitutional right to final judgment from an Article III judge.
And with good reason. The backdrop against which the Supreme Court
decided all of those modern constitutional decisions was an extensive
jurisprudence, that the Court itself expressly constructed within the framework
of the historical summary-plenary distinction, precisely for the purpose of
strictly limiting the adjudicatory powers of non-Article III bankruptcy arbiters
to traditional summary matters. 112 Indeed, even in the face of evident
congressional authorization for non-Article III bankruptcy referees to finally

106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Id. at 1952, 1954 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2012).
See infra Part II.A.1.
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
Stern v. Marshall, 546 U.S. 462 (2011).
See infra Part II.A.2–B.
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adjudicate plenary suits under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the Supreme Court
held in Weidhorn v. Levy 113 that it nonetheless would be inappropriate for a
non-Article III judicial officer to entertain a plenary suit.
Thus, it was the Supreme Court (and not Congress) that strictly limited “the
authority and jurisdiction of the [non-Article III] referee [to] the ordinary
[summary] administrative proceedings in bankruptcy and such controversial
matters as arise therein and are in effect a part thereof.” 114 The Court itself fully
acknowledged that “to what extent jurisdiction conferred . . . shall be exercised
by summary proceedings” before a non-Article III referee, “and to what extent
by plenary suit” in an Article III court, was “(subject to the constitutional
guaranties)” “determined by decisions of this court.” 115 And that summaryplenary jurisprudence contains a striking counterpart and precursor 116 to even
the Court’s most recent constitutional decision in Wellness.
A. In Search of the Constitutional Validity of Non-Article III Bankruptcy
Adjudications Without Litigant Consent
On two occasions (in Marathon 117 and Stern 118), the Supreme Court has
squarely held that litigants have a constitutional right to final judgment from an
Article III judge in particular bankruptcy proceedings. On a third occasion (in
Granfinanciera 119), reasoning critical to the Court’s holding indicated that the
same is true in a trustee’s fraudulent conveyance suit, and the Court has since
(particularly in Stern) treated that case as, at least in part, an Article III
decision. 120 In each case, the Court concluded that the claim at issue fell within
the oft-repeated prohibition (from Murray’s Lessee 121) that Congress cannot
“withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the
subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.” 122 Thus, the
statutes giving non-Article III bankruptcy judges jurisdiction to finally
113

253 U.S. 268 (1920), discussed infra Part II.A.2.
Id. at 273.
115 Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 431 & n.8 (1924).
116 See MacDonald v. Plymouth Cty. Tr. Co., 286 U.S. 263 (1932), discussed infra Part II.B.1.
117 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
118 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011).
119 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
120 See generally Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 150–51.
121 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
122 Id. at 284; see Stern, 564 U.S. at 484; Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 52–54; Marathon, 458 U.S. at 68–
71 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); id. at 90–91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). That quotation from Murray’s
Lessee is a prominent hallmark of the formal, categorical approach to defining the right to final judgment from
an Article III judge. See supra Part I.B.
114
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adjudicate the claims at issue were declared unconstitutional in both Marathon
and Stern, and the clear implication of Granfinanciera was that “Congress
could not constitutionally assign resolution of the fraudulent conveyance action
[at issue] to a non-Article III court.” 123
There is a conspicuous asymmetry, though, in the Court’s decisions
regarding the constitutionality of non-Article III bankruptcy adjudications
without litigant consent. While the Court has now struck down as
unconstitutional certain non-Article III bankruptcy adjudications without
consent of the litigants, the Court has never upheld as constitutionally valid, in
the face of a clear constitutional challenge thereto, a final-judgment nonArticle III bankruptcy adjudication without consent of the litigants. 124
Moreover, a majority of the Court has never agreed on a constitutional theory
that would validate final-judgment adjudications by non-Article III bankruptcy
judges without consent of the litigants. Indeed, the coy opinion structure in the
Stern v. Marshall decision raised the possibility that a majority of the Court
might ultimately conclude that the entirety of bankruptcy judges’ statutory
“core” jurisdiction—to render final judgment without litigant consent 125—is
unconstitutional. 126
With the Wellness decision, a majority of the Justices—the Stern dissenters
(Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) and the Wellness dissenters
(Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas)—have now indicated their belief that the bulk
of bankruptcy judges’ core jurisdiction is indeed constitutionally valid.
However, no single constitutional explanation therefor has clearly garnered the
explicit approval of a majority of the Court.

123 Stern, 564 U.S. at 492 n.7; see also Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2169 n.3
(2014) (stating “Granfinanciera held that a fraudulent conveyance claim under Title 11 is not a matter of
‘public right’ for purposes of Article III and that the defendant to such a claim is entitled to a jury trial under
the Seventh Amendment” (emphasis added and citations omitted)); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135
S. Ct. 1932, 1953 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that “this Court has implied” in Granfinanciera
that a trustee’s fraudulent conveyance suit “must be adjudicated by an Article III court”). See generally
Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 182–83.
124 Of course, Wellness held that it is constitutionally permissible for bankruptcy judges to finally
adjudicate even a Marathon- or Stern-like non-core claim with consent of the litigants. Moreover, in Arkison
the Court specifically noted that bankruptcy judges’ more limited involvement in non-core claims even without
consent of the litigants—heard by a non-Article III bankruptcy judge who submits proposed findings and
conclusions for de novo review by an Article III district court judge before entry of final judgment in the
district court—“does not implicate the constitutional defect identified by Stern.” Arkison, 134 S. Ct. at 2170;
see 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (2012); supra note 8.
125 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).
126 See generally Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 174–76.
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That constitutional uncertainty is more than a mere academic curiosity
because the core-jurisdiction statute was overtly designed to give non-Article
III bankruptcy judges as much final-judgment jurisdiction as is constitutionally
permissible (but no more). 127 And after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Stern
and Arkison, it is now clear that the determinative inquiry in deciding whether
a particular proceeding is core or non-core is (with only one exception) entirely
a constitutional one. 128 Hence, a federal bankruptcy proceeding 129 is a “core”
proceeding, in which a bankruptcy judge can enter final judgment without
litigant consent, if (and only if) that is constitutionally permissible under
Article III (even if that proceeding is not one that the statute itself explicitly
designates as “core”). 130 Conversely, if the proceeding is one in which the
parties have a constitutional right to final judgment from an Article III judge
(even if that proceeding is one that the statute itself expressly denominates as
“core”), then the bankruptcy court should “simply treat the claims as noncore.” 131
Given that the core-jurisdiction statute codifies constitutional limits, then,
the lingering constitutional ambiguity will continue to confound attempts to
discern the line between (1) those matters in which bankruptcy judges can
enter final judgment without litigant consent, and (2) those matters in which
they cannot because the litigants have a constitutional right to final judgment
from an Article III judge. Both of the leading theories for why non-Article III
bankruptcy adjudications are constitutionally permissible, though, are
grounded in the historical distinction between (i) summary matters of estate
and case administration, and (ii) plenary suits against adverse claimants.
Moreover, the Supreme Court itself invoked the historical summary-plenary
127

See generally id. at 135–37; Brubaker, Bleak House (Part I), supra note 6, at 9–10.
See supra notes 5 & 8 and accompanying text. The only claims for which constitutional principles are
not determinative are otherwise-core “personal injury tort and wrongful death claims against the estate,” which
the statute explicitly provides are not core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B); see also id. § 157(b)(5)
(mandating trial of “personal injury tort and wrongful death claims” in a federal district court); id. § 1411(a)
(preserving “any right to trial by jury that an individual has under applicable nonbankruptcy law with regard to
a personal injury or wrongful death tort claim”).
129 I.e., one within federal subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
130 The non-exclusive nature of the list of statutorily specified “core” proceedings in § 157(b)(2), in
conjunction with the so-called catch-all categories in § 157(b)(2)(A) & (O) and the extremely vague statutory
specification in § 157(b)(1) of core proceedings as including all those that “arise in” a bankruptcy case, are all
sufficiently capacious to give bankruptcy judges as much core jurisdiction as is constitutionally permissible.
See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1)–(2); id. § 157(b)(2)(A) & (O). See generally Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra
note 2, at 136–41, 145–46; Brubaker, Bleak House (Part I), supra note 6, at 9–12, 13–14.
131 Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2173 (2014); see 28 U.S.C. § 157(c); supra
notes 5 & 8 and accompanying text.
128
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divide in framing its extensive jurisprudence limiting (to summary matters) the
adjudicative authority of non-Article III bankruptcy referees, 132 authorized by
and appointed under the longstanding Bankruptcy Act of 1898 133 (which
remained in effect until superseded by the current Bankruptcy Code, enacted in
1978). Unsurprisingly, therefore, that summary-plenary jurisprudence has
served as a presumptive guidepost for determining the constitutionality of nonArticle III bankruptcy adjudications, 134 and all of the Court’s decisions
regarding the constitutionality of non-Article III bankruptcy adjudications
(including Wellness) are consistent with the proposition that the Court is
simply constitutionalizing its summary-plenary jurisprudence.
1. The “Public Rights” Theory
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding non-Article III adjudications
recognizes a category of so-called “public rights” disputes that may be finally
adjudicated by non-Article III tribunals, sometimes referred to as a “public
rights” exception to Article III. As Justice Thomas pointed out in his Wellness
dissent, though, “[t]he distinction between disputes involving ‘public rights’
and those involving ‘private rights’ is longstanding, but the contours of the
‘public rights’ doctrine have been the source of much confusion and
controversy,” and “[o]ver time, the line between public and private rights has
blurred.” 135 Likewise, the validity and scope of a “public rights” theory in the
context of bankruptcy adjudications is also subject to considerable
uncertainty. 136
Justice Brennan’s opinion for a four-Justice plurality in Marathon, while
noting “that a matter of public rights must at a minimum arise ‘between the
government and others,’” nonetheless also suggested that “the restructuring of
debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy
power . . . may well be a ‘public right.’” 137 In Granfinanciera, however, Justice

132 See Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 129–30; Brubaker, Litigant Consent, supra note
7, at 7; Brubaker, Bleak House (Part I), supra note 6, at 7.
133 Pub. L. No. 55-171, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (amended variously 1903–1976 & repealed 1978)
[hereinafter 1898 Act], reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY app. A, pt. 3(a) (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommers eds., 16th ed. 2016) [hereinafter COLLIER (16th ed.)].
134 See Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 150–57.
135 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1964–65, 1966 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
136 See generally Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 164–67, 180–85.
137 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69, 71 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion) (citation omitted); see also id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (acknowledging the plurality’s
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Brennan walked back that earlier flirtation with a “public rights” explanation
for bankruptcy adjudications. Writing for a five-Justice majority, Brennan
completely disavowed his earlier suggestion with the turnabout that “[w]e do
not suggest that the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations is in fact a public
right.” 138 A sixth Justice went even further. Justice Scalia’s concurrence flatly
rejected the applicability of the “public rights” doctrine to bankruptcy
adjudications because of his “view [that] a matter of ‘public rights’ . . . must at
a minimum arise ‘between the government and others.’” 139
In Stern v. Marshall, 140 a majority of the Court continued to expressly
refuse to adopt any version of a “public rights” justification for non-Article III
bankruptcy adjudications. Justice Scalia reiterated his view that “public rights”
matters are limited to disputes between private citizens and the Government
and, thus, cannot have any applicability to bankruptcy adjudications. 141 And
Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion repeated the Granfinanciera
disclaimer of a “public rights” account. 142 The Stern majority, thus, chose to
“follow the same approach” as the Granfinanciera Court (as well as that of
Justice Rehnquist in his two-Justice Marathon concurrence 143), in that “even if
one accepts this thesis” that the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations is a
public right, the chapter 11 debtor’s state-law tortious interference claim at
issue “does not fall within any of the varied formulations of the public rights
exception in this Court’s cases” “any more than” did the chapter 11 debtor’s
damages claim “under state common law between two private parties” in
Marathon. 144
A majority of the Court, therefore, has never embraced the proposition that
non-Article III bankruptcy adjudications are “public rights” adjudications. A
majority of the Court, however, has expressly and repeatedly questioned
whether the “public rights” doctrine has any purchase at all in the bankruptcy
suggestion that some “powers granted under th[e 1978 Bankruptcy Reform] Act might be sustained under the
‘public rights’ doctrine”).
138 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 n.11 (1989) (emphasis added).
139 Id. at 65 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
140 564 U.S. 462 (2011).
141 Id. at 503 (Scalia, J., concurring).
142 “We noted that we did not mean to ‘suggest that the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations is in fact
a public right.’” Id. at 492 n.7 (Roberts, C.J., for the Court) (quoting Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 56 n.11).
143 “To whatever extent different powers granted under th[e 1978 Bankruptcy Reform] Act might be
sustained under the ‘public rights’ doctrine . . . I am satisfied that the adjudication of [chapter 11 debtor]
Northern’s [breach of contract] lawsuit cannot be so sustained.” N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 91 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
144 Stern, 564 U.S. at 487, 492 n.7, 493.
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context. Moreover, any potential public-rights explanation for non-Article III
bankruptcy adjudications must take into account two important considerations,
extrapolated from the analysis set forth in Part I.B: (1) the apparent
commitment of a majority of the Court over a long run of decisions (Marathon,
Granfinanciera, and Stern) to formalism as the appropriate means for
explicating the scope of individual litigants’ constitutional right to final
judgment from an Article III judge “in any matter which, from its nature, is the
subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity,” 145 and thus, correlatively, (2)
that specification of the matters in which non-Article III bankruptcy judges can
render final judgment without litigant consent likewise must be defined in
terms of formal, categorical rules.
To the extent, then, that a more capacious conception of the “public rights”
doctrine (i.e., in disputes not involving the Government) is linked to a
pragmatic, functional balancing methodology for evaluating the
constitutionality of non-Article III adjudications without litigant consent (as
did the four dissenters in Stern), 146 any such rendering of the “public rights”
doctrine is inconsistent with the Court’s Marathon, Granfinanciera, and Stern
decisions. 147 And regardless of who ultimately succeeds the late Justice Scalia
on the Court, it seems exceedingly unlikely that the Court would overturn, en
masse, Marathon, Granfinanciera, and Stern.
a. A “Public Rights” Exception or Established Historical Practice?
It is extremely difficult to discern, from the Court’s decisions, just what it
is that makes a matter a “public rights” dispute appropriate for final
adjudication by a non-Article III tribunal. The Court first articulated a “public
145 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856); see supra
Part I.B.
146 See Stern, 564 U.S. at 510–13 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Court’s decisions in Thomas and Schor (per
Brennan’s suggestion in Marathon) appear to have abandoned the limitation that “public rights” matters must
involve the Government as a party. Although both Thomas and Schor involved litigant consent to the nonArticle III adjudications at issue (see supra note 55 and accompanying text), those decisions (unlike the
majority opinion in Wellness) also linked their more expansive version of the “public rights” doctrine to a
functional balancing methodology: “In essence, the public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic
understanding that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that ‘could be
determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches,’ the danger of encroaching on the judicial powers is
reduced.” Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985) (citations omitted); see also
CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853–54 (1986).
147 Significantly, the Wellness majority opinion (and unlike the decisions in Thomas and Schor and the
Stern dissent) made no mention of the “public rights” doctrine in its functional assessment of the validity of
non-Article III bankruptcy adjudications with litigant consent. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135
S. Ct. 1932, 1938–47 (2015); supra note 146.

BRUBAKER GALLEYSPROOFS3

44

12/26/2016 12:47 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 33

rights” exception to Article III adjudications in the 1855 case of Murray’s
Lessee, as follows:
[W]e do not consider congress can either withdraw from judicial
cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit
at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty; nor, on the other hand,
can it bring under the judicial power a matter which, from its nature,
is not a subject for judicial determination. At the same time there are
matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such
form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which
are susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or
may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United
States, as it may deem proper. 148

One way to understand this famous passage is as acknowledging a certain
grey area between those matters inherently judicial in their nature and those of
an executive nature. Indeed, as Professor Jaffe pointed out, “an important
development in modern legal thinking,” widely accepted by the time of the
Founding and that would have informed the Framing generation’s ideas
regarding separation of powers, was that “the courts became identified with the
enforcement of private right, and administrative agencies with the execution of
public policy,” and “[m]uch of the later development of administrative law
attempted to reconcile the conflicts developed by this dichotomy and to
harmonize them within the frame of a constitutional system built on the rule of
law.” 149 Justice Thomas, in his Wellness dissent, elaborated as follows:
The Founders carried this idea forward into the Vesting Clauses
of our Constitution. Those Clauses were understood to play a role in
ensuring that the federal courts alone could act to deprive individuals
of private rights because the power to act conclusively against those
rights was the core of the judicial power. As one early treatise
explained, the judiciary is “that department of the government to
whom the protection of the rights of the individual is by the
constitution especially confided.” 1 St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s
Commentaries, App. 357 (1803). If “public rights” were not thought
to fall within the core of the judicial power, then that could explain
why Congress would be able to perform or authorize non-Article III
adjudications of public rights without transgressing Article III’s
Vesting Clause. 150

148
149
150

Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.
Louis L. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review I, 71 HARV. L. REV. 401, 413 (1958).
Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1965 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

BRUBAKER GALLEYSPROOFS3

2016]

12/26/2016 12:47 PM

NON-ARTICLE III ADJUDICATION

45

Likewise, Professor Pfander posits that the Framers understood that certain
matters “fell outside the judicial power due to the traditional limits on the
scope of the powers of the English superior courts of law, equity, and
admiralty.” 151 With respect to bankruptcy adjudications, the Founding
generation’s understanding of the “judicial Power” was obviously shaped by
the English “system of adjudication that took place in part outside the superior
courts of law, equity, and admiralty,” 152 through what Blackstone characterized
as an “extrajudicial method of proceeding” before commissioners appointed by
the Lord Chancellor in Equity. 153 Moreover, the work of these bankruptcy
commissioners did, indeed, seem to occupy a grey area between the judicial
and the executive. 154
“Bankruptcy commissioners were not judges,” and “parliaments did not
endow bankruptcy commissions with the attributes of a court.” 155 Nonetheless,
English “bankruptcy acts gave broad powers to bankruptcy commissioners to
adjudicate issues that arose in the bankruptcy” administration. 156 Indeed,
bankruptcy commissioners “determined almost all of the issues arising in . . .
the administration of the [bankrupt’s] estate and the case.” 157 And Professor
Pfander is undoubtedly correct that “the dual function of the commissioners in
administering the estate and adjudicating certain claims may provide an
important key to understanding” the constitutional validity of non-Article III
bankruptcy adjudications. 158
As Professor McCoid noted, the characteristic function of English
bankruptcy commissioners was both executive and judicial in nature:
151 James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States,
118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 715 (2004).
152 Id. at 719.
153 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *477 (1765).
154 The Lord Chancellor, who appointed bankruptcy commissioners and exercised supervisory powers
over their work, was himself an embodiment of commingled executive and judicial functions. See DAN B.
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION 59–63 (2d ed. 1993); GARY L. MCDOWELL,
EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 24–29, 35 (1982); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 44, at 46–48 (1836); Lynn S. Branham,
Keeping the “Wolf Out of the Fold”: Separation of Powers and Congressional Termination of Equitable
Relief, 26 J. LEGIS. 185, 211 (2000); William Lindsay Carne, A Sketch of the History of the High Court of
Chancery from its Origin to the Chancellorship of Wolsey, 15 GEO. L.J. 426, 426–27, 434–37, 460–61 (1927).
155 W.J. Jones, The Foundations of English Bankruptcy: Statutes and Commissions in the Early Modern
Period, 69 TRANSACTIONS AM. PHIL. SOC’Y. No. 3, at 1, 10 (1979).
156 Thomas E. Plank, Why Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and Should Not Be Article III Judges, 72 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 567, 590 (1998).
157 Id. at 576.
158 Pfander, supra note 151, at 720.
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Necessarily making determinations of law and fact as they carried out
these duties, the commissioners clearly functioned in a judicial
fashion, and colloquially, at least, they could be labeled a court. In
many respects, however, their work perhaps more nearly resembled
the activities of our present-day administrative agencies. 159

Indeed, under English law, colonial statutes, and the first federal bankruptcy
statute (the Bankruptcy Act of 1800), commissioners had wide-ranging powers
to administer a debtor’s estate, including even the power to directly seize the
body and effects of the debtor and break into any premises for that purpose. 160
As Professor Pfander points out, then, “the early refusal of Congress to
place the administration of bankruptcy estates entirely in the hands of Article
III judges may reflect a recognition . . . that the administrative work of
commissioners did not fit comfortably within the definition of the judicial
power of the United States” 161 because, in the words of Mr. Justice Curtis in
Murray’s Lessee, Congress cannot “bring under the judicial power a matter
which, from its nature, is not a subject for judicial determination.” 162
Correlatively, Professor Plank correctly notes that the 1800 Act’s “grant of
original [adjudicatory] jurisdiction to bankruptcy commissioners and not to
Article III judges suggests that the early Congresses did not consider such
original bankruptcy jurisdiction to fall within the ‘judicial Power.’” 163 In other
words, and per Justice Curtis in Murray’s Lessee, the traditional adjudicatory
powers of bankruptcy commissioners fall into the grey area between executive
and judicial functions and, thus, “are matters, involving public rights, which
may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on
them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress
may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States,
as it may deem proper.” 164
159

John C. McCoid, II, Right to Jury Trial in Bankruptcy: Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 15, 30 (1991).
160 See generally id. at 28–37; Plank, supra note 156, at 578–80, 584–87, 599, 603–06, 608–09.
161 Pfander, supra note 151, at 720.
162 Murray’s Lesee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856).
163 Plank, supra note 156, at 609 (emphasis added).
164 Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284. Indeed, in the first federal bankruptcy statute, the 1800
Act, Congress chose not to bring the traditional work of bankruptcy commissioners within the original
jurisdiction of the federal courts. In the second federal bankruptcy statute, however, the Bankruptcy Act of
1841, Congress chose to give original bankruptcy jurisdiction to the federal district courts, rather than
commissioners, “in all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy . . . said jurisdiction to be exercised summarily,
in the nature of summary proceedings in equity.” Ch. 9, § 6, 5 Stat. 440, 445 (1841) (repealed 1843), reprinted
in 10 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 72, at 1738, 1742 [hereinafter 1841 Act]. See generally Brubaker, A
“Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 126 & n.25.
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This account, of course, would place the traditional adjudicatory powers of
bankruptcy commissioners squarely within Justice Thomas’s conception of a
“public rights” exception to Article III. 165 Such a depiction of the “public
rights” doctrine, moreover, is very similar to (and, indeed, likely
indistinguishable from) Justice Scalia’s conviction that exceptions to Article III
must be grounded in established historical practice. As he stated in his Stern v.
Marshall concurrence:
Leaving aside certain adjudications by federal administrative
agencies, which are governed (for better or worse) by our landmark
decision in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), in my view an
Article III judge is required in all federal adjudications, unless there
is a firmly established historical practice to the contrary. For that
reason—and not because of some intuitive balancing of benefits and
harms—I agree that Article III judges are not required in the context
of territorial courts, courts-martial, or true “public rights” cases.
Perhaps historical practice permits non-Article III judges to process
claims against the bankruptcy estate; the subject has not been briefed
so I state no position on the matter. But [Anna Nicole Smith] points
to no historical practice that authorizes a non-Article III judge to
adjudicate a counterclaim of the sort at issue here. 166

In Wellness, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas all
embraced just such a historical-practice justification for the validity of final
adjudications by non-Article III bankruptcy judges, even without litigant
consent. Roberts’ dissenting opinion, in a Part joined by both Scalia and
Thomas, set forth a “narrow historical exception that permits a non-Article III
adjudicator in certain bankruptcy proceedings” 167 as follows:
Our precedents have also recognized an exception to the
requirements of Article III for certain bankruptcy proceedings. When
the Framers gathered to draft the Constitution, English statutes had
long empowered nonjudicial bankruptcy “commissioners” to collect a
debtor’s property, resolve claims by creditors, order the distribution
of assets in the estate, and ultimately discharge the debts. See 2 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *471–488. This historical practice,
combined with Congress’s constitutional authority to enact
bankruptcy laws, confirms that Congress may assign to non-Article

165 Though Justice Thomas himself was hesitant to draw that conclusion, opining instead that
“[b]ankuprtcy courts . . . are not an easy fit in the ‘public rights’ category.” Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v.
Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1967 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
166 564 U.S. 462, 504 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
167 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1954 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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III courts adjudications involving “the restructuring of debtor-creditor
relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power.”
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S., at 71 (plurality opinion). 168

Indeed, as I have argued at length before, the best reading of the Court’s
cumulative jurisprudence of non-Article III bankruptcy adjudications is that the
Court has constitutionalized the traditional distinction between “summary”
matters of estate and case administration, as distinguished from “plenary” suits
at law or in equity by the estate’s representative to recover money or property
from a so-called “adverse claimant.” 169 Adjudication of historically summary
matters by non-Article III officials has a long, established historical pedigree,
rooted in the commissioner adjudications of English bankruptcy practice,
which were also employed by Congress in the very first federal bankruptcy
statute in 1800. Likewise, the Supreme Court itself approved of, but strictly
limited, non-Article III bankruptcy referees (authorized and appointed under
the longstanding Bankruptcy Act of 1898) to adjudication of summary
matters. 170
That a “public rights” account of non-Article III bankruptcy adjudications
would ultimately be grounded in established historical practice should not be
terribly surprising. In fact, as astutely noted by Justice White in his Marathon
dissent, historically summary matters seem to be exactly what Justice Brennan
had in mind with his “public rights” characterization of “the restructuring of
debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy
power.” 171 As Justice White put it:
168 Id. at 1951 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justice Thomas, in his separate dissent, described the
“bankruptcy exception” to Article III in similar terms:

Article I’s Bankruptcy Clause serves to carve cases and controversies traditionally subject to
resolution by bankruptcy commissioners out of Article III, giving Congress the discretion, within
those historical boundaries, to provide for resolution outside of Article III courts.
Id. at 1967–68 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
169 See generally Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 150–57; Brubaker, Bleak House (Part
II), supra note 2, at 3–6; Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A General
Statutory and Constitutional Theory, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 776–77 & n.111 (2000) [hereinafter
Brubaker, A General Theory].
170 See Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 122–30; infra Part II.A.2–B.
171 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion). That was even clearer in Brennan’s majority opinion in Granfinanciera, in which he directly relied
upon the historical summary-plenary divide in concluding that fraudulent conveyance suits by a bankruptcy
estate—“quintessentially [plenary] suits at common law”—are not “integral to the restructuring of debtorcreditor relations.” Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56, 58 (1989); see also id. at 76–77 (White,
J., dissenting) (astutely observing that “the Court determine[d] that an action to recover fraudulently conveyed
property is not ‘integrally related’ to the essence of bankruptcy proceedings” because “under federal
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I take it that the Court does not condemn as inconsistent with Art. III
the assignment of these functions—i.e., those within the summary
jurisdiction of the old [non-Art. III referees]—to a non-Art. III judge,
since, as the plurality says, they lie at the core of the federal
bankruptcy power. They also happen to be functions that have been
performed by referees . . . for a very long time and without
constitutional objection. 172

Justice Thomas’s opinion for the unanimous Arkison Court likewise opined
that Justice Brennan’s “public rights” characterization of the “core of the
federal bankruptcy power” was simply “a description of those claims that fell
within the scope of the historical” summary bankruptcy jurisdiction. 173 And
Chief Justice Roberts’ depiction of a “bankruptcy exception” to Article III in
his Wellness dissent, quoted above, also equates Brennan’s “public rights”
description of “the core of the federal bankruptcy power” with historically
summary matters. 174
Moreover, the outside limit of that historical practice was undoubtedly the
basis for the holding in Marathon—that it was unconstitutional for Congress to
give non-Article III bankruptcy judges final-judgment adjudicatory authority in
a traditional plenary suit against an adverse claimant. Indeed, as Justice
Rehnquist pointed out in his Marathon concurrence, such quintessential
plenary suits “are the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the
courts at Westminster in 1789,” 175 which Congress cannot “withdraw from
judicial cognizance.” 176 Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion, likewise, leaned

bankruptcy statutes predating the 1978 Code,” “actions such as this one were solely heard in plenary
proceedings in Article III courts”); id. at 93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice White that the
Court was employing “a century-old conception of what is and is not central to the bankruptcy process”). See
generally Brubaker, “A Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 152–54.
172 Marathon, 458 U.S. at 99 (White, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
173 Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2171 & n.7 (2014).
174 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
175 Marathon, 458 U.S. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
176 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856). And the
same, of course, was true in both Granfinanciera (see supra note 171) and in Stern: “Like the contract claim in
Northern Pipeline, the tort claim in Stern involved ‘the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by
the courts at Westminster in 1789,’” and thus, “Congress had no power under the Constitution to assign
resolution of such a claim to a judge who lacked the structural protections of Article III.” Wellness Int’l
Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1952 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Stern v. Marshall,
564 U.S. 462, 513 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (conceding “that the nature of the claim to be adjudicated
argues against” the constitutionality of final adjudicatory power in a non-Article III tribunal, because the claim
at issue—“a kind of tort suit—resembles ‘a suit at the common law.’” (quoting Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18
How.) at 284)).
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upon “historical consensus” for a “limiting principle” 177 that Congress had
contravened with respect to the suit at issue in Marathon:
[T]he Court has recognized certain exceptional powers bestowed
upon Congress by the Constitution or by historical consensus. Only
in the face of such an exceptional grant of power has the Court
declined to hold the authority of Congress subject to the general
prescriptions of Art. III. 178

The Marathon plurality, like Justice Rehnquist, however, could “discern no
such exceptional grant of power applicable in the [action] before” the
Court, 179—an action that had consistently been recognized as requiring a
plenary suit in a superior court since well before, at the time of, and for nearly
two centuries after the Founding. 180
b. Just What Is a “Public Right,” Really?
Others have proffered “public rights” accounts of a “bankruptcy exception”
to Article III that are untethered from the category of traditionally summary
matters. 181 If one is committed, however, to drawing a formal, categorical line
that cordons off “any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at
the common law, or in equity,” 182 in order to ensure that litigants retain a
constitutional right to final judgment from an Article III judge in such a matter
(and, as discussed in Part I.B of this article, the Court has insisted on drawing
such a line), established historical practice has much to commend it.
In the abstract (i.e., untethered from historical context), just what a “public
right” is remains a mystery and, thus, has no discernible (much less
generalizable) meaning. Even more troubling, though, wherever one might
177

Marathon, 458 U.S. at 73 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
Id. at 70 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
179 Id. at 71 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
180 See generally Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 122–32.
181 See, e.g., Brook Gotberg, Preferences Are Public Rights, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 1355 (arguing that
preference suits should be considered “public rights” adjudications); Jonathan C. Lipson & Jennifer L.
Vandermeuse, Stern, Seriously: The Article I Judicial Power, Fraudulent Transfers, and Leveraged Buyouts,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 1161 (arguing that fraudulent conveyance suits should be considered “public rights”
adjudications). Historically, however, both preference and fraudulent conveyance actions by the estate’s
representative required a plenary suit at law or in equity. See McCoid, supra note 159, at 20–27, 30–31.
Indeed, the plenary nature of a typical preference or fraudulent conveyance suit received express statutory
recognition in the text of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See 1898 Act, supra note 133, §§ 60b, 67e, 70e(3). See
generally 2 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 72, ¶ 23.15; 3, pt. 2 id. ¶ 60.60[1.1]; 4 id. ¶ 67.44[1]; 4B id.
¶ 70.91[1].
182 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856).
178
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draw such a line in the bankruptcy context (in a way that remains faithful to the
Court’s existing precedent) is also completely untethered from Article III
values of judicial independence and structural separation of powers.
Thus, consider the opposite-extreme examples of matters that virtually all
observers acknowledge are and, conversely, are not constitutionally within the
final adjudicatory powers of non-Article III bankruptcy judges without consent
of the litigants. The paradigmatic examples of the latter are Marathon- and
Stern-like claims by the debtor’s bankruptcy estate to recover money or
property from a third party, such as a damages action for a defendant’s alleged
prebankruptcy tort or breach of contract. The paradigmatic example of the
former is adjudication of an unsecured creditor’s claim against a debtor’s
bankruptcy estate, such as a damages claim for a debtor’s alleged
prebankruptcy tort or breach of contract. 183 Are structural separation of powers
concerns less pertinent in the former as compared to the latter? Are judicial
independence concerns less pertinent in the former as compared to the latter?
There is no good reason to think that they are. Indeed, as I have argued before:
The most salient potential prejudicial influences on bankruptcy
judges’ decisions likely come from the bankruptcy bar. However,
those potential prejudices (and even speculative hypothetical
incursions from the other political branches) seem to be just as (if not
more) potent in proceedings in which bankruptcy judges can . . .
unquestionably render final judgment, as they are in [Marathon- and
Stern-like] noncore “related to” proceedings. 184

More nuanced attempts to directly incorporate Article III values into the
inquiry, 185 therefore, will not necessarily produce results consistent with the
Court’s existing precedent. Moreover, they inevitably move away from formal,
categorical line-drawing and toward functional balancing, which (as discussed
in Part I.B of this article) the Court has rejected in cases not involving litigant
consent to the non-Article III adjudication at issue.
The only principled way to draw a formal, categorical line between the
latter and the former (and the Supreme Court has been committed to doing so)
is using established historical practice. Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has
already developed an extensive jurisprudence, explicitly constructed within the
183 See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 329–30 (1966). The Stern majority treated the Katchen case as an
Article III decision. See Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 155–57, 173.
184 Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 188 (footnote omitted).
185 See, e.g., Troy McKenzie, Getting to the Core of Stern v. Marshall: History, Expertise, and the
Separation of Powers, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 23 (2012).
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framework of the historical summary-plenary distinction, precisely for the
purpose of strictly limiting the adjudicatory powers of non-Article III
bankruptcy arbiters to traditionally summary matters.
2. The Supreme Court’s Summary-Plenary Jurisprudence
In allocating jurisdictional authority under the earliest federal bankruptcy
statutes, both Congress and the Supreme Court invoked the traditional
summary-plenary divide, 186 and pursuant thereto:
The procedural divide established under the early American
bankruptcy statutes . . . simply adopted the English practice requiring
a formal plenary suit in assignee [now trustee or debtor-inpossession] actions to recover money or property from an adverse
claimant. As in England, American assignees had to pursue adverse
claimants through formal plenary suits commenced in either a federal
district or circuit court. All other “bankruptcy proceedings,” however,
were conducted by summary processes in the federal district court,
and as in England, early Congresses also authorized (non-Article III)
bankruptcy commissioners to act as first-instance adjudicators in
summary bankruptcy proceedings. For example, in the very first
federal bankruptcy statute, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, bankruptcy
commissioners were given powers very similar to those of English
bankruptcy commissioners, and similar to the relationship between
English commissioners and the Lord Chancellor, decisions by the
1800 Act commissioners were subject to revision only through a
petition for review of the commissioners’ determinations filed with
the federal district court. 187

In the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Congress authorized the appointment of
bankruptcy referees, 188 who were non-Article III judicial officers analogous to
English and 1800 Act bankruptcy commissioners. The 1898 Act authorized the
district courts to refer any and all bankruptcy matters to referees, 189 and in
matters so referred authorized referees, in an extremely broad and open-ended
fashion, to exercise the same “jurisdiction to . . . perform such of the duties as
are by this Act conferred on courts of bankruptcy.” 190 Moreover, the Act
186

See generally Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 124–26.
Id. at 126 (footnotes omitted).
188 1898 Act, supra note 133, §§ 33–34.
189 Id. § 22a. After 1938, most bankruptcy cases were automatically referred to referees, as a matter of
course. See 2 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 72, ¶¶ 22.01–22.03.
190 With only those limited exceptions “herein otherwise provided.” 1898 Act, supra note 133, § 38(6). As
originally enacted in § 38(4), this provision had slightly different wording, but was to the same effect. See Pub.
187
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defined the term “court” to include both the district court and the referee, 191
and required referees to “take the same oath of office as that prescribed for
judges of United States courts.” 192 Indeed, in summary proceedings, the
Supreme Court treated the referee as the equal of the judge, allowing him to
enter final orders reviewable only by appeal and having the same preclusive
effects as a district court decision. 193
By the express terms of the 1898 Act, therefore, Congress authorized a
referee—although he was not an Article III judge—to act as the court in a
referred case, with “all jurisdiction given the courts of bankruptcy.” 194 In fact,
on its face, the 1898 Act authorized non-Article III bankruptcy referees to hear
and finally adjudicate even a plenary suit against an adverse claimant that
could only be brought in a superior court of law or equity in England in
1789—the epitome of a “matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit
at the common law, or in equity.” 195 Indeed, several lower courts, including the
First Circuit in the case of In re Weidhorn, so held. 196 In Weidhorn v. Levy, 197
though, the Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit. That decision, therefore,
is extremely significant in understanding the nature of the limitation the Court
thereby imposed on non-Article III referees’ adjudicatory powers.
a. The Weidhorn v. Levy Decision
In Weidhorn v. Levy, after the debtor’s bankruptcy case had been referred
generally (i.e., without limitation 198) to the bankruptcy referee, the bankruptcy
trustee filed a plenary suit before the referee “to avoid two conveyances by the
bankrupt to his brother, on the alleged ground that they had been made with

L. No. 55-171, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 555 (1898) (granting referees “jurisdiction to . . . perform such part of the
duties . . . as are by this Act conferred on courts of bankruptcy”), reprinted in 2A COLLIER (14th ed.), supra
note 72, ¶ 38.01, at 1395 n.2.
191 See 1898 Act, supra note 133, §§ 1(10), 1(20), 1(26) (defining “court,” “judge,” and “referee”).
192 Id. § 36. The 1898 Act also required that records of proceedings before referees be kept and provided
that the records so kept constituted “records of the court.” Id. § 42.
193 See Weidhorn v. Levy, 253 U.S. 268, 271–72 (1920); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 334 (1966);
Page v. Ark. Natural Gas Corp., 286 U.S. 269, 270–72 (1932). See generally 2A COLLIER (14th ed.), supra
note 72, ¶¶ 38.02, 39.01[5], 39.16, 39.28, 39.29.
194 2A COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 72, ¶ 38.08[2], at 1415.
195 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856).
196 253 F. 28, 29–32 (1st Cir. 1917) (summarizing the case law and concluding that there is nothing in the
Act to exclude plenary suits from the operation of 1898 Act § 38 giving referees adjudicatory jurisdiction that
is co-extensive with that of district court judges).
197 253 U.S. 268 (1920).
198 See generally 2 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 72, ¶ 22.05.
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intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors.” 199 The Supreme Court,
employing the classic, well-settled summary-plenary distinction, easily
concluded that the matter at issue, from its nature, was the subject of a plenary
suit:
[I]f the property [at issue] were in the custody of the bankruptcy
court or its officer, any controversy raised . . . setting up a title to or
lien upon it might be determined on summary proceedings in the
bankruptcy court, and would fall within the jurisdiction of the
referee. White v. Schloerb, 178 U.S. 542, 546 [1900]; Mueller v.
Nugent, 184 U.S. 1, 13 [1902].
But in the present instance the controversy related to property
not in possession or control of the court or of the bankrupt or any one
representing him at the time [the bankruptcy] petition [was] filed, and
not in the court’s custody at the time of the controversy, but in the
actual possession of the bankrupt’s brother under an adverse claim of
ownership based upon conveyances made more than four months
before the institution of the proceedings in bankruptcy. In order to set
aside these conveyances and subject the property to the
administration of the court of bankruptcy a plenary suit was
necessary, and such was the nature of the one that was instituted. 200

The debtor’s brother, though, “promptly objected to the jurisdiction of the
referee” to hear and adjudicate such a plenary suit, but the referee overruled
the brother’s “jurisdictional objection, proceeded to hear the merits, and
entered a final decree in favor of the trustee.” 201 The Supreme Court, however,
held that a “general reference” of an entire bankruptcy case simply could not
authorize the referee to handle a plenary matter.
The Weidhorn v. Levy Court could point to no specific provisions in the
1898 Act (because there were none) that precluded reference of a plenary suit
to a referee nor that excluded plenary suits from the statutory grant to referees
of general adjudicatory jurisdiction co-extensive with that of district court
judges. Indeed, precisely the opposite was true; the terms of the 1898 Act
itself, on their face, clearly and expressly authorized a referee to adjudicate
199

In re Weidhorn, 253 F. at 29.
Weidhorn v. Levy, 253 U.S. at 271–72. Historically, the summary-plenary divide not only determined
the scope of a non-Article III bankruptcy tribunal’s adjudicatory powers, it also determined the appropriate
process to be used (regardless of the forum) in litigating the proceeding at issue. See Brubaker, A “Summary”
Theory, supra note 2, at 128–29; Ralph Brubaker, Justice Story, Bankruptcy Injunctions, and the AntiInjunction Act of 1793, 92 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 67, 76 (2014) [hereinafter Brubaker, Justice Story and
Bankruptcy Injunctions].
201 Weidhorn v. Levy, 253 U.S. at 269.
200
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plenary suits in referred cases. 202 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that it
would be inappropriate for a bankruptcy referee to adjudicate a plenary suit,
simply relying upon the familiar, traditional summary-plenary distinction, in
and of itself (and invoking no other credible reasoning or authority):
We find nothing in the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act that makes it
necessary or reasonable to extend the authority and jurisdiction of the
referee beyond the ordinary administrative proceedings in bankruptcy
and such controversial matters as arise therein and are in effect a part
thereof, or to extend the authority of the referee under the general
reference so as to include jurisdiction over an independent and
plenary suit such as the one under consideration. 203

b. The Supreme Court’s Superintendence of the Common-Law SummaryPlenary Divide
Note, then, that it was not the statute, by its terms, that limited referees to
adjudication of summary matters; rather, it was the Supreme Court that
independently imposed that limitation, in apparent contravention of the express
terms of the statute. Indeed, a fair inference is that Weidhorn v. Levy is an

202 See supra notes 188–196 and accompanying text. Thus, when the Weidhorn v. Levy Court stated, in
general terms (and without reference to any specific statutory provisions) that “[t]he provisions of the act, as
well as the title of his office, indicate that the referee is to exercise powers not equal to or co-ordinate with
those of the court or judge,” 253 U.S. at 273 (emphasis added), that statement was manifestly (and
transparently) untrue; the provisions of the act clearly stated just the opposite.
203 Weidhorn v. Levy, 253 U.S. at 273. The Court’s intimation that use of the term “proceedings” in the
Supreme Court’s general order of reference limited the matters that could be referred to a referee—in a manner
that excluded plenary suits—is not a sound basis for the holding. See id.; General Orders and Forms in
Bankruptcy, Gen. Order XII(1), 172 U.S. 653, 657 (1898) (providing that upon general reference of an entire
bankruptcy case, “thereafter all the proceedings . . . shall be had before the referee”); 1898 Act, supra note
133, § 30 (“All necessary rules, forms, and orders as to the procedure and for carrying this Act into force and
effect shall be prescribed, and may be amended from time to time, by the Supreme Court of the United
States.”). As Justice Story had held under the 1841 Act and as the Court would later reaffirm under the 1898
Act, general jurisdictional references to bankruptcy “proceedings” have always subsumed and included
plenary suits. See Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 313 (1845); Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U.S. 102, 106–
08 (1910) (tracing 1841 Act § 6 to 1867 Act § 1 to 1898 Act § 2); Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 646–62
(1947). See generally Brubaker, A General Theory, supra note 169, at 759–77; Ralph Brubaker, One Hundred
Years of Federal Bankruptcy Law and Still Clinging to an In Rem Model of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction,
15 BANKR. DEV. J. 261, 264–69 (1999). Indeed, the same remains true to this day. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b),
157(a) (2012) (pervasively employing the “proceedings” terminology in the bankruptcy jurisdiction grants of
both the district courts and the bankruptcy courts). And in the subsequent case of MacDonald v. Plymouth
County Trust Co., 236 U.S. 263, 268 (1932), the Court made clear that plenary suits were indeed
“proceedings” within the meaning and scope of General Order XII. See infra notes 252–256 and
accompanying text.

BRUBAKER GALLEYSPROOFS3

56

12/26/2016 12:47 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 33

example of implicit constitutional avoidance in action. 204 And the Court
developed an extensive jurisprudence (with dozens of decisions over the
course of multiple generations) fleshing out the category of summary matters
appropriate for final adjudication by non-Article III referees. 205 Indeed, the last
edition of the leading practice treatise under the 1898 Act, in a section dated
1974, states that the Court’s “general principles regarding the summary
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court have been affirmed and reaffirmed in a
chain of decisions beginning with White v. Schloerb [in 1900] and extending
down to the present date.” 206
Thus, while the Court would sometimes loosely describe its summary
jurisdiction decisions as addressing a “statutory question,” 207 that
characterization is misleadingly inexact. Indeed, as Justice Brandeis frankly
acknowledged in Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 208 in the course of
addressing an objection to the summary jurisdiction of a bankruptcy referee:
Congress has, also (subject to the constitutional guaranties), power to
determine to what extent jurisdiction conferred . . . shall be exercised
by summary proceedings and to what extent by plenary suit. It has
not done so in terms. In the absence of congressional definition of the
scope of summary proceedings, it has been determined by decisions
of this court . . . . 209

In other words, Congress did have the power (within constitutional limits) to
determine what matters were appropriate for adjudication by referees (in
summary proceedings) and what matters had to be tried in a federal district

204 A common criticism of constitutional avoidance is that it inevitably “distorts” the meaning of statutes.
See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal
Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2112, 2115–16, 2118–22 (2015); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional
Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1577–78
(2000). As Justice Holmes candidly acknowledged, “[w]ords have been strained” in order to avoid declaring a
statute unconstitutional, as “I suppose that we all agree that to do so is the gravest and most delicate duty that
this Court is called upon to perform.” Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147–48 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
concurring).
205 See generally 2A COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 72, ¶ 38.09[2]; 2 id. ¶¶ 23.02–23.11 (collecting
voluminous case law); KENNETH N. KLEE & WHITMAN L. HOLT, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT:
1801–2014, at 148–56 (2015).
206 2 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 72, ¶ 23.04[2], at 455–56.
207 See, e.g., Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966). And I hereby confess that I am guilty of the
same offense. See, e.g., Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 155–57, 186.
208 264 U.S. 426 (1924).
209 Id. at 431 & n.8 (1924); see also Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. at 328 (“Congress has often left the exact
scope of summary proceedings in bankruptcy undefined, and . . . in the absence of congressional definition this
is a matter to be determined by decisions of this Court.”).
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court (by plenary suit). Congress did not do so; therefore, the Supreme Court
(within constitutional limits) determined what matters were appropriate for
adjudication by referees (in summary proceedings) and what matters had to be
tried in a federal district court (by plenary suit).
The Supreme Court, therefore, (and not Congress) strictly limited nonArticle III referees to adjudication of traditionally summary matters because it
obviously considered plenary suits at law or in equity to be beyond the
appropriate competence of referees. Moreover, as the Court fully
acknowledged, its summary-plenary jurisprudence was necessarily
administered with constitutional considerations in mind, and that entire
jurisprudence originated in the distinction between a summary bankruptcy
matter and a plenary suit at law or in equity as those concepts had developed in
England. 210 Sharply delineating “any matter which, from its nature, is the
subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity,” which cannot be
“withdraw[n] from judicial cognizance,” 211 pervaded the entire jurisdictional
structure under every federal bankruptcy system before 1978. 212 Indeed, the
1841, 1867, and 1898 Acts all contained a separate jurisdictional grant giving
jurisdiction to the old trial-level circuit courts in plenary “suits at law or in
equity.” 213 And as the Supreme Court itself readily recognized, that
“jurisdiction . . . of all suits at law or in equity . . . is the regular jurisdiction
between party and party, as described in the Judiciary Act and the third article
of the Constitution,” 214 and such an action “could only be enforced by a
plenary suit, at law or in equity,” in an Article III court. 215
“[T]he dichotomy between plenary assignee/trustee suits at law or in equity
via an original complaint or bill, as distinguished from so-called summary

210 See Marshall v. Knox, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 551, 554–57 (1872); Smith v. Mason, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.)
419, 429–33, 432 n.† (1871) (citing Ex parte Bacon, 2 Molloy 441 (Ir. Ch. 1810)); see also GEORGE TAYLOR,
THE BANKRUPT LAW, ACT OF MARCH 2, 1867, WITH NOTES AND REFERENCES TO ENGLISH DECISIONS 61–62
(1867) (citing Ex parte Bacon, 2 Molloy 441 (Ir. Ch. 1810)).
211 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856).
212 See Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 122–30; Brubaker, A General Theory, supra
note 169, at 755–77; Plank, supra note 156, at 606–10.
213 See 1841 Act, supra note 164, § 8; Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 2, 14 Stat. 517, 518 (amended
1874 and repealed 1878), reprinted in 10 COLLIER (14th. ed.), supra note 72, at 1746, 1747; Bankruptcy Act of
1898, Pub. L. No. 55-171, ch. 541, § 23a, 30 Stat. 544, 552 (amended 1926 & 1938 and repealed 1978),
reprinted in 10 Collier (14th ed.), supra note 72, at 1783, 1799 & n.7. For a discussion of these provisions, see
Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 125–26, 127 & n.29; Brubaker, A General Theory, supra
note 169, at 761 & n.54, 763–64 & n.60, 768–72.
214 Morgan v. Thornhill, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 65, 80 (1870).
215 Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524, 532 (1900).
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bankruptcy proceedings in equity on motion or petition” is “one of the most
prominent, fundamental, and longstanding jurisdictional and procedural
divides with respect to bankruptcy proceedings” in our Anglo-American legal
tradition. 216 Little wonder, then, that the Supreme Court’s summary-plenary
jurisprudence—determining when a matter, from its nature, is the subject of a
plenary suit at law or in equity that, therefore, requires trial in an Article III
court—has been considered to presumptively, if not dispositively, control
Article III questions in and ever since the Marathon decision. The three
Wellness dissenters, likewise, relied upon that jurisprudence to determine
“whether the claim Wellness submitted to the bankruptcy court . . . requires
final adjudication by an Article III court.” 217 Moreover, the holding of the
Wellness majority regarding consent adjudications is also fully consistent with
the Court’s summary-plenary jurisprudence and the proposition that the Court,
in the entire series of constitutional decisions—from Marathon to
Granfinanciera to Stern to Wellness—is simply constitutionalizing its
summary-plenary jurisprudence.
B. The Constitutional Significance of the Supreme Court’s Summary-Plenary
Jurisprudence
Whether cast as a “public rights” exception to Article III or simply
established historical practice that would have informed the Founders’
understanding of the Article III “judicial Power” in the context of bankruptcy
adjudications, the upshot is the same: Traditional summary matters “may be
presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and
[they] are susceptible of judicial determination, but . . . congress may or may
not bring [them] within the cognizance of the [Article III] courts of the United
States, as it may deem proper.” 218 By contrast, traditional plenary suits are the
“suits at law or in equity . . . described in . . . the third article of the
Constitution,” 219 and thus, such a plenary “matter which, from its nature, is the
subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity” cannot be “withdraw[n] from

216

Brubaker, Justice Story and Bankruptcy Injunctions, supra note 200, Abstract, available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2469339.
217 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1952 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see id.
at 1952–54.
218 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856).
219 Morgan v. Thornhill, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 80.
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judicial cognizance” 220 and can “only be enforced by a plenary suit, at law or in
equity,” in an Article III court. 221
Indeed, in Morgan v. Thornhill, the Court described Congress’s
characteristic use of the phrase “suits at law or in equity” to refer to traditional
plenary suits as “showing conclusively that the jurisdiction intended to be
conferred is the regular jurisdiction between party and party, as described
in . . . the third article of the Constitution.” 222 Yet, it was the Supreme Court
(and not Congress) that strictly limited “the authority and jurisdiction of the
[non-Article III] referee [to] the ordinary [summary] administrative
proceedings in bankruptcy and such controversial matters as arise therein and
are in effect a part thereof.” 223 As the Court itself acknowledged, “to what
extent jurisdiction conferred . . . shall be exercised by summary proceedings”
before a non-Article III referee, “and to what extent by plenary suit” in an
Article III court, was “(subject to the constitutional guaranties)” “determined
by decisions of this court.” 224 And the Court’s most recent decision in Wellness
is also consistent with the thesis of this Part II that the Court is simply
constitutionalizing its extensive summary-plenary jurisprudence as the
operative limitation on the adjudicatory powers of non-Article III bankruptcy
judges.
1. Non-Article III Bankruptcy Adjudications With Litigant Consent
In upholding the constitutionality of Judicial Code § 157(c)(2) 225—
authorizing a non-Article III bankruptcy judge to finally adjudicate even a
Marathon- or Stern-like non-core “related to” proceeding with consent of the
litigants—the Wellness majority noted the analogous practice under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898: Non-Article III referees “could preside over . . .
matters implicating the [district] court’s ‘plenary jurisdiction’ by consent” of
the litigants, 226 citing the Court’s 1932 decision of MacDonald v. Plymouth
County Trust Co. 227

220

Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.
Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524, 532 (1900).
222 Morgan v. Thornhill, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 80.
223 Weidhorn v. Levy, 253 U.S. 268, 273 (1920); see Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at
129–30; supra Part II.A.2.
224 Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 431 & n.8 (1924).
225 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (2012).
226 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1939 (2015).
227 286 U.S. 263 (1932).
221
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The Wellness majority did not specifically rely upon MacDonald as having
any particular precedential force in upholding the constitutionality of
§ 157(c)(2). Careful analysis of MacDonald is nonetheless highly instructive,
though, because MacDonald was a pivotal decision in the Court’s general
jurisprudence charting the outermost limits of the adjudicative powers of nonArticle III referees. Significantly, MacDonald clearly exposed the “summary”
limit on referees’ adjudicatory powers to be a constraint independently
imposed by the Supreme Court (and not Congress). Moreover, that decision
addressed both the structural and individual-rights aspects of referee
adjudications that were determinative in the Wellness Court’s constitutional
analysis (discussed in Part I.B of this article). MacDonald and Wellness,
therefore, provide further evidence that the Court is simply constitutionalizing
(even if sub silentio) its existing summary-plenary jurisprudence.
a. The MacDonald v. Plymouth County Trust Co. Decision
In MacDonald, after a Massachusetts corporation “was duly adjudicated a
bankrupt . . . the case under the usual order authorized by [the Supreme
Court’s] General Order XII was referred [generally, i.e., without limitation 228]
by the District Court to a referee in bankruptcy.” 229 The trustee then “filed a
petition with the referee to set aside certain alleged transfers of property by the
bankrupt . . . as voidable preferences,” 230 which raised “matters properly
determinable only in a plenary suit.” 231 The defendant, though, “consented in
open court that the trial of the issues proceed before the referee.” 232 After trial,
the “referee made an order, based on findings, granting in part the relief
prayed,” 233 and the District Court upheld the referee’s authority to hear and
determine the matter with consent of the litigants. 234 The First Circuit,
however, “reversed the order of the District Court, holding that as the issues
before the referee were determinable only in a plenary suit, the referee,
notwithstanding the consent of the parties, was without jurisdiction to decide

228

See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
Plymouth Cty. Tr. Co. v. MacDonald, 53 F.2d 827, 828 (1st Cir. 1931), rev’d, 286 U.S. 263 (1932).
230 286 U.S. at 264–65.
231 53 F.2d at 829.
232 286 U.S. at 265.
233 Id.
234 In re Craig, Reed & Emerson, Inc., 46 F.2d 811, 811 (D. Mass. 1931), rev’d sub nom., Plymouth Cty.
Tr. Co. v. MacDonald, 53 F.2d 827 (1st Cir.), rev’d, 286 U.S. 263 (1932).
229
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them.” 235 The Supreme Court, though, upheld the validity of the referee’s
consent adjudication.
The First Circuit proceeded on the assumption that the Supreme Court’s
prior decision in Weidhorn v. Levy was an interpretation of the terms of the
1898 Act and the Supreme Court’s General Order XII (authorizing general
orders of reference) that construed those provisions as affirmatively excluding
plenary suits from a general order of reference. So read, Weidhorn v. Levy
would indeed seem to implicate a structural limitation on the adjudicatory
powers of referees akin to the Article III structural limitations on federal
courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction: not only must the matter at issue be a case
or controversy of the kind that Article III, § 2 of the Constitution authorizes the
federal courts to entertain (a structural federalism principle), Congress must
also have invested the federal courts with such subject-matter jurisdiction via a
duly enacted jurisdictional statute (a structural separation-of-powers
principle). 236
As the First Circuit reasoned, then (citing Weidhorn v. Levy), if Congress
has affirmatively precluded referees from entertaining plenary matters under a
general reference, then that restriction is in the nature of a non-waivable
structural separation-of-powers limit on the “subject-matter jurisdiction” of
referees:
[A] referee under a general order of reference, having no jurisdiction
over the subject-matter, cannot acquire jurisdiction by consent of the
parties. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Willard, 220 U.S. 413, 420
[1911].
The objection to the jurisdiction of the referee before the District
Court after the appellant had consented to the referee hearing the
matter may have been ‘unsportsmanlike,’ as it was characterized by
the District Judge; but lack of jurisdiction may be raised on review,
and at any stage of the proceedings. A litigant is not bound by the
findings of any tribunal having no jurisdiction over the subjectmatter, even if found with his consent. The proceedings before the
referee were coram non judice. 237

As the Court’s modern Article III, § 1 jurisprudence also recognizes,
requiring that matters within the “judicial Power” must be adjudicated by an
235

286 U.S. at 265.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States shall be vested
in . . . such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”).
237 53 F.2d at 830 (citations omitted).
236
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Article III judge does indeed serve structural separation-of-powers values “as
‘an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and balances,’”
and thus, “[t]o the extent this structural principle is implicated in a given case,
the parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty for the same
reason that the parties by consent cannot confer on federal courts subjectmatter jurisdiction.” 238 And, of course, that was precisely the reasoning of
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia, dissenting in Wellness: “[A]n
individual may not consent away the institutional interest protected by the
separation of powers.” 239 The unanimous MacDonald Court’s response to that
structural argument, therefore, is every bit as instructive as the majority’s
response in Wellness.
b. Limitation of Non-Article III Referees to Adjudication of Summary
Matters Primarily Protected Personal Rather Than Structural Interests
While Article III, § 1—like Article III, § 2 and subject-matter jurisdiction
limitations—does indeed serve non-waivable structural values, the Court’s
modern jurisprudence also acknowledges that the Article III, § 1 guarantee
(unlike subject-matter jurisdiction limitations) “serves to protect primarily
personal, rather than structural, interests.” 240 Thus, both the Schor and Wellness
decisions reasoned:
“[A]s a personal right, Article III[, § 1]’s guarantee of an impartial
and independent federal adjudication is subject to waiver, just as are
other personal constitutional rights”—such as the right to a jury—
“that dictate the procedures by which civil and criminal matters must
be tried.” 241

In strikingly similar terms that prefigure both Schor and Wellness, the
MacDonald Court also opined (citing to the Seventh Amendment jury-trial
decision of Patton v. United States 242) that bankruptcy litigants’ right to insist
upon trial of a plenary suit in an Article III court is “like the right to trial by
jury,” which may “be waived”:
238

CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850–51 (1986) (citation omitted).
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1955 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see id.
at 1955–57 (also quoting the same passage from Schor quoted supra in the text accompanying note 238);
supra Part I.B.7 (discussing the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, in
Wellness).
240 Schor, 478 U.S. at 848; see also Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1944 (“The entitlement to an Article III
adjudicator is a ‘personal right’ and thus ordinarily ‘subject to waiver.’” (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 848)).
241 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1943 (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 848–49).
242 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
239
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[W]e can perceive no reason why the privilege of claiming the
benefits of the procedure in a plenary suit [in an Article III court]
may not be waived by consent, as any other procedural privilege of
the suitor may be waived, and a more summary procedure [before a
bankruptcy referee] substituted. Cf. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
Willard, 220 U.S. 413, 419–421 [1911]. 243

Significantly, then, with the “Cf.” citation to the Willard case and its
extensive discussion of the non-waivable structural limitations on federal
courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction (and on which the First Circuit had relied for
its contrary decision), the MacDonald Court expressly dismissed such
structural concerns. 244 Of course, Schor and Wellness make clear the Court’s
role in scrutinizing any particular system of non-Article III consent
adjudications to determine whether it “impermissibly threatens the institutional
integrity of the Judicial Branch.” 245 And while the written opinion of the
Wellness majority more explicitly reviewed the structural implications of
consent adjudications by non-Article III bankruptcy judges, that opinion
ultimately reached the same conclusion as did the MacDonald Court (with
respect to a very similar system of consent adjudications by non-Article III
bankruptcy referees): Non-Article III “[a]djudication based on litigant consent”
is “unremarkable” and “poses no great threat to anyone’s birthrights,
constitutional or otherwise.” 246 Even Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that
as a practical matter such consent adjudications do, in fact, “seem benign.” 247
As both Schor and Wellness confirm, the constitutional validity of nonArticle III consent adjudications transcends the bankruptcy context:
“Adjudication based on litigant consent has been a consistent feature of the
federal court system since its inception.” 248 That the MacDonald Court, like the
243

MacDonald v. Plymouth Cty. Tr. Co., 286 U.S. 263, 267 (1932).
The Stern majority likewise expressly distinguished the structural limitations of subject-matter
jurisdiction, “stating that nothing in the allocation of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction as between Article III
district courts and non-Article III bankruptcy courts is ‘jurisdictional’ in the sense that would invoke subject
matter jurisdiction doctrines, such as the one holding that issues of subject matter jurisdiction are nonwaivable
and can be raised at any time (including for the first time on appeal or sua sponte by the court).” Brubaker, A
“Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 144–45; see id. at 187; Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 480 (2011).
245 Schor, 478 U.S. at 851, quoted in Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1944.
246 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1947.
247 Id. at 1959 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
248 Id. at 1947 (Sotomayor, J., for the Court). And that is the response to Justice Thomas’s concern, in his
separate Wellness dissent, that there is no Founding-era evidence of “a historical practice of allowing broader
adjudication by [English] bankruptcy commissioners [of plenary suits] acting with the consent of the parties.”
Id. at 1970 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see supra note 62 and accompanying text and note 67. The validity of
consent adjudications, however, is not premised upon a unique “bankruptcy exception” to Article III, but
244
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Wellness majority, expressly considered both the structural and individualrights dimensions of referee consent adjudications is even more significant,
then, given what the MacDonald decision confirms regarding the nature of the
Supreme Court’s summary-plenary jurisprudence in the bankruptcy context.
c. Limitation of Non-Article III Referees to Adjudication of Summary
Matters Was Independently Imposed by the Supreme Court (Not
Congress)
In Wellness, the Seventh Circuit dismissed MacDonald as irrelevant, with
the mistaken claim that “MacDonald was decided on statutory grounds—the
question was whether the referee had statutory jurisdiction.” 249 That
assumption, however, misapprehends the non-statutory nature of the Court’s
summary-plenary jurisprudence 250 strictly limiting non-Article III referees to
adjudication of summary matters. 251 Indeed, to the extent that was unclear from
the Weidhorn v. Levy opinion, MacDonald confirms that it was the Supreme
Court that independently imposed that limitation (and not Congress).
MacDonald, therefore, was simply another in the long line of Supreme Court
decisions independently crafting prudential limitations on the adjudicatory
powers of non-Article III referees.
Nowhere did the 1898 Act or the Supreme Court’s General Orders in
Bankruptcy provide even the vaguest indication that referees could adjudicate
plenary suits with consent of the litigants. The MacDonald Court’s “statutory”
analysis, therefore, simply pointed out that the statute explicitly “contemplates
that referees within their districts may be invested with the powers of courts of
bankruptcy,” 252 citing 1898 Act § 38 (entitled “Jurisdiction of Referees”)
providing that “[r]eferees . . . are hereby invested . . . with jurisdiction to . . .
perform such . . . of the duties . . . as are by this Act conferred on courts of

rather rests on more general constitutional principles regarding non-Article III adjudications, of which nonArticle III bankruptcy consent adjudications are simply a longstanding, consistent, illustrative instance, which
the Supreme Court approved as early as 1878. See Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U.S. 581, 582–83 (1878); supra
notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
249 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 772 (7th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 1932
(2015).
250 It is a common misunderstanding, though, that the Supreme Court itself has fostered through its loose
and misleadingly imprecise characterizations of its summary-plenary jurisprudence as “statutory.” See supra
note 207 and accompanying text and infra Part II.B.2.
251 See supra Part II.A.2.
252 MacDonald v. Plymouth Cty. Tr. Co., 286 U.S. 263, 268 (1932).
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bankruptcy.” 253 And, the Court went on, “General Order XII [regarding general
orders of reference] directs that after the appointment of the referee all
proceedings shall be had before him.” 254 It was “[t]hese provisions,” then,
according to the Court, that “vest[ed] in [the referee] the power possessed by
courts of bankruptcy . . . to decide the issues in a [plenary] suit brought under
section 60b [to avoid and recover preferential transfers] where the parties join
in presenting them to him for determination.” 255
Because those provisions made no mention whatsoever of litigant consent,
though, that same “statutory” analysis (as discussed in Part II.A.2 of this
article) would lead to the conclusion that a referee could adjudicate a plenary
suit even without consent of the litigants. 256 MacDonald, therefore, confirmed
that the only reason referees could not adjudicate a plenary suit without litigant
consent was because the Court itself had independently concluded that it would
be beyond the appropriate competence of a referee to do so:
In cases where the defendant made timely objection to a
determination by the referee, it has been said that the referee is
without power to hear the issues involved in a plenary suit, and that
such a suit, if brought before him, must be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction. See Weidhorn v. Levy, supra. 257

Hence, the further conclusion in MacDonald that referees could hear and
adjudicate a plenary suit with litigant consent was also simply another
independent determination by the Court (not Congress) that such a consent
adjudication was within the appropriate competence of a non-Article III
referee:
While under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act the exercise of his
jurisdiction by the referee is ordinarily restricted to those matters
which may be dealt with summarily by the method of procedure
available to referees in bankruptcy [see Weidhorn v. Levy, supra], the
restriction may be removed, as it was here, by the consent of the

253 See 2A COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 72, ¶ 38.01, at 1395 n.2 (quoting the language of 1898 Act § 38
in effect when MacDonald was decided in 1932).
254 MacDonald, 286 U.S. at 268 (emphasis added).
255 Id.
256 Moreover, by concluding that a plenary suit was within the scope of the “proceedings” referred to in
General Order XII, MacDonald also flatly repudiated the suggestion in Weidhorn v. Levy, 253 U.S. 268, 273
(1920), that use of the term “proceedings” in General Order XII somehow excluded plenary suits from the
scope of a general order of reference or precluded reference of plenary suits to a referee. See supra note 203.
257 MacDonald, 286 U.S. at 266 (emphasis added).
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parties to a summary trial of the issue presented. The referee
therefore had power to decide the issues . . . . 258

By the terms of the 1898 Act itself, Congress authorized non-Article III
referees to hear and adjudicate plenary suits; the decision that it would be
inappropriate for a non-Article III referee to do so, therefore, was made
entirely by the Supreme Court (not Congress). The terms of the 1898 Act itself
said nothing about the ability of non-Article III referees to hear and adjudicate
an otherwise-plenary suit with consent of the litigants; the decision that it
would be appropriate for a non-Article III referee to do so, therefore, was also
made solely by the Supreme Court (not Congress). 259
2. Non-Article III Bankruptcy Adjudications Without Litigant Consent
The entirety of the Supreme Court’s extensive jurisprudence regarding the
adjudicatory powers of non-Article III referees consisted of independent
determinations by the Court as to those matters appropriate for adjudication by
a non-Article III referee. Moreover, as was the case in both Weidhorn v.
Levy 260 and MacDonald, 261 the Court’s propensity to enshroud those decisions
258

Id. at 268.
The MacDonald Court’s discussion of the consent provision of 1898 Act § 23b (286 U.S. at 267–68)
was not only virtually incomprehensible and utterly incoherent, it was also an elaborate red herring. That
provision spoke solely to federal subject-matter jurisdiction, generally denying the federal courts any
bankruptcy jurisdiction whatsoever over most plenary suits “unless by consent of the proposed defendant.”
And as the Court made clear in Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 646–62 (1947), § 23b was not a grant of
jurisdiction to anyone—neither district judges nor referees—but rather was an affirmative restriction on the
broad all-inclusive grant in 1898 Act § 2 of federal jurisdiction over all bankruptcy “proceedings.” See
generally Brubaker, A General Theory, supra note 169, at 767–77.
Moreover, federal subject-matter jurisdiction in MacDonald was not dependent upon “consent of the
defendant” at all, as that case involved a preference suit under § 60b, which was expressly excepted from
§ 23b’s withdrawal of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction (granted by § 2) over plenary suits. Thus, the federal
district courts had jurisdiction over plenary preference suits under § 60b (as well as plenary fraudulent
conveyance suits under §§ 67e and 70e) even without “consent of the defendant.” See generally 2 COLLIER
(14th ed.), supra note 72, ¶¶ 23.01[3], 23.15. The First Circuit in MacDonald, therefore, was absolutely correct
that the consent provision of § 23b was wholly inapplicable to the MacDonald case because § 23b simply “has
no application to suits by the trustee to recover a preference, or property conveyed in fraud of creditors.” 53
F.2d at 830. The MacDonald Court’s addled discussion of the consent provision of § 23b, therefore, was
gratuitous, irrelevant “window dressing.”
Indeed, the lower courts readily recognized that § 23b was completely immaterial to the MacDonald
holding, because they concluded that its holding also permitted a referee to finally adjudicate a plenary suit
with litigant consent in corporate reorganization cases under Chapter X, which by its express terms provided
that § 23 was entirely inapplicable in a Chapter X case. See, e.g., Morrison v. Rocco Ferrera & Co., 554 F.2d
290, 296–97 (6th Cir. 1977); see 1898 Act, supra note 133, § 102, discussed in Brubaker, A General Theory,
supra note 169, at 774–75.
260 253 U.S. 268 (1920), discussed supra Part II.A.2.
259
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in feigns of “due consideration of the structure and purpose of the Bankruptcy
Act as a whole, as well as the particular provisions of the Act brought in
question,” 262 was (if not subterfuge) empty and meaningless rhetorical flourish.
For example, the congressional purpose that purportedly guided the
Katchen Court’s decision—a desire “to secure a prompt and effectual
administration and settlement of the estate of all bankrupts within a limited
period” 263—would always counsel in favor of giving non-Article III referees
full adjudicatory jurisdiction over all traditional plenary suits. 264 Indeed, the
decision Katchen quoted for that proposition, Ex parte Christy, actually
involved a traditional plenary matter and the Court (via a Justice Story
opinion) ultimately concluded that such a plenary suit could be handled by a
district court through “summary proceedings in equity” rather than a plenary
“suit at law or in equity.” 265 Note also, because Christy merely authorized
summary adjudication of a traditional plenary matter by an Article III district
court, 266 Christy ultimately says nothing about the appropriate scope of nonArticle III bankruptcy adjudications. Likewise, the congressional purposes and
provisions the Court purported to rely on when determining the limits on the
adjudicatory powers of non-Article III referees (as in Weidhorn v. Levy,
MacDonald, and Katchen) were invariably makeweights that also said nothing
at all about limiting referees’ adjudicatory powers.
Thus, the Court itself, with no guidance from Congress, was independently
determining the appropriate limits on non-Article III referees’ adjudicatory
powers, and in doing so, the Court relied upon the longstanding traditional
summary-plenary distinction that undoubtedly would have informed the
Framers’ understanding of the Article III “judicial Power” in the bankruptcy
context. Indeed, because the summary-plenary divide long preceded and
existed independently of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (and every prior
American bankruptcy statute), that is no doubt why Congress did not generally

261

See supra Part II.B.1.c.
Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966).
263 Id. (quoting Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 312 (1845)).
264 Cf. Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 136–37 (making a similar point regarding
interpretation of the scope of the catch-all categories of statutory “core” proceedings in 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(A) & (O) (2012)).
265 See Brubaker, Justice Story and Bankruptcy Injunctions, supra note 200, at 77 & n.38, 86–88.
266 Because the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 at issue made no provision whatsoever for final adjudications by
non-Article III arbiters without litigant consent. See Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 126–27
n.25.
262
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define the distinction between summary and plenary matters. 267 From the
earliest years of the Republic, it was the courts (and ultimately the Supreme
Court) that preserved and policed the distinction between summary bankruptcy
matters of estate and case administration, in contradistinction to plenary trustee
suits against adverse claimants. 268 The Supreme Court itself, without any
guidance from Congress, charted the limits of non-Article III referees’
adjudicatory powers, drawing its guidance from the traditional summaryplenary distinction.
III. USING THE SUPREME COURT’S SUMMARY-PLENARY JURISPRUDENCE TO
RESOLVE CORE-NONCORE DETERMINATIONS
The current bankruptcy jurisdiction statute, like predecessor statutory
references to summary or plenary matters, does not definitively specify how to
determine whether a given matter is, on the one hand, a “core” proceeding in
which the bankruptcy judge can enter final judgment without litigant consent
or, on the other, a non-core “related to” proceeding in which the parties have a
right to final judgment from the district court. 269 That statutory distinction,
therefore, simply codifies the constitutional line, particularly given the Arkison
decision, that if a statutory “core” matter is one in which litigants have a
constitutional right to final judgment from an Article III judge (a so-called

267 Rather, Congress generally would simply refer, e.g., to plenary suits as “suits at law or in equity,”
which language the Supreme Court characterized as “showing conclusively that the jurisdiction intended to be
conferred is the regular jurisdiction between party and party, as described in . . . the third article of the
Constitution.” Morgan v. Thornhill, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 65, 80 (1870); see also Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U.S. 516,
517 (1876) (describing 1867 Act jurisdictional grant over plenary “suits at law or in equity” as “jurisdiction[]
as an ordinary court”). It was left to the courts, therefore, to specify those matters which, by their nature,
required a plenary suit. See, e.g., Marshall v. Knox, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 551, 556 (1872) (“The bankrupt law
does not distinguish in what cases the District Court may proceed summarily, and in what cases by plenary
suit; and we are left to decide the question on the general principles that affect the case.”); see also Smith v.
Mason, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 419, 430–33 (1871) (applying the 1867 Act); Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at
314–15, 316–17 (applying the 1841 Act). In doing so, the Court relied upon the contours of the summaryplenary divide as it had developed in English bankruptcy practice. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
268 In Lathrop v. Drake, the Court described these “two distinct classes” of bankruptcy jurisdiction as
follows:

[F]irst, jurisdiction as a court of bankruptcy over the [summary] proceedings in bankruptcy
initiated by the petition, and ending in the distribution of assets amongst the creditors, and the
discharge or refusal of a discharge of the bankrupt; secondly, jurisdiction, as an ordinary court, of
[plenary] suits at law or in equity . . . .
91 U.S. at 517.
269 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)–(c). See generally Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 135–37;
Brubaker, Bleak House (Part I), supra note 6, at 9–10.
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Stern claim), then the “statute permits [such a] Stern claim[] to proceed as noncore within the meaning of” the statute. 270 Moreover, in many cases, the statute
itself does not clearly categorize a particular proceeding as core or non-core, in
which case that categorization must be made, in the first instance and last,
based solely upon the parties’ constitutional rights, “consistent with Congress’s
obvious objective of giving bankruptcy courts as much core jurisdiction as is
constitutionally permissible (but no more than is constitutionally
permissible).” 271 This Part III, therefore, demonstrates the continuing relevance
of the Supreme Court’s summary-plenary jurisprudence to the core-noncore
distinction drawn by the current jurisdictional provisions.
As the Tenth Circuit noted shortly after Wellness was decided,
“[r]ecognizing the summary-plenary line as the operative constitutional
boundary” not only has “the virtue of consistency with historical practice” that
would have informed the Founding generation’s understanding of the nature of
the Article III “judicial Power” in the context of bankruptcy adjudications, it
can also “afford lower courts (some of) the guidance they’ve long wanted.” 272
Indeed, the Wellness litigation itself nicely demonstrates how the Court’s
extensive summary-plenary jurisprudence can help resolve even the most
difficult (and inevitable) “hard cases.” 273 This Part III uses the Wellness
litigation to illustrate several dimensions by which the Supreme Court has
differentiated between (1) summary matters appropriate for final adjudication

270 Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2173 (2014); see supra notes 127–131 and
accompanying text.
271 Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 146.
272 Loveridge v. Hall (In re Renewable Energy Dev. Corp.), 792 F.3d 1274, 1282 (10th Cir. 2015).
273 It is easy criticize a historical approach to the constitutional issue on the grounds that there are indeed
“hard cases” (like Wellness) that are not resolved in an entirely self-evident and effortless manner using the
summary-plenary distinction. See, e.g., McKenzie, supra note 185, at 35–41. The most that critique
establishes, though, is that perhaps it would be better do away with such uncertain line-drawing exercises, as
Congress did in the context (and via an expansion) of subject-matter jurisdiction in 1978. See Brubaker, A
General Theory, supra note 169, at 792–95. Of course, Congress sought to do the same in 1978 with respect to
the adjudicatory powers of the new bankruptcy courts, but Congress’s decision to not give bankruptcy judges
Article III status, the Marathon decision, “the subsequent codification of a core/non-core distinction
(analogous to the summary/plenary distinction),” as well as Stern’s emphatic reaffirmation of the Marathon
holding, all conspire to “make such uncertain line-drawing exercises inevitable.” Brubaker, A “Summary”
Theory, supra note 2, at 174 n.231. Moreover, those who believe Marathon, Granfinanciera, and Stern were
wrongly decided and dream of a world in which Schor functional balancing was the controlling constitutional
check (even in the absence of litigant consent to a non-Article III adjudication) are pining for a regime that is
likely much less determinate than the established, longstanding summary-plenary divide, especially if (as is
certainly the most likely course of events) the Marathon, Granfinanciera, and Stern holdings are not
overturned. See Chemerinsky, supra note 40, at 317–22; supra notes 35–41 and accompanying text, notes
117–123 and accompanying text, notes 145–147 and accompanying text, and Part II.A.1.b.
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by a non-Article III bankruptcy tribunal, even without litigant consent, and (2)
plenary suits at law or in equity in which the parties have a right to final
judgment from an Article III judge. And the Wellness dissenters relied upon
that jurisprudence (and the analytical structure supplied thereby) to conclude
that “Article III likely pose[d] no barrier to the Bankruptcy Court’s resolution
of Wellness’s claim,” even without consent of the litigants. 274
In disputes involving money or other property (including damages claims),
the initial inquiry regarding summary/core jurisdiction must focus upon
possession of the property at issue. Property within the actual or constructive
possession of the estate’s representative or the debtor is considered within the
possession and control of the bankruptcy court, giving the bankruptcy court
summary/core jurisdiction to adjudicate any and all claims to that property,
including those of a so-called “adverse claimant.” 275 If the property at issue is
in the possession of some other, third party, that property is beyond the
summary/core jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court (thus, requiring a
plenary/non-core suit to recover) only if that third party raises a substantial
adverse claim entitling that party to keep the property. 276 Even with respect to
property held under a substantial claim of right by a third party, however, the
bankruptcy court has supplemental summary/core jurisdiction to adjudicate
conflicting claims to that property to the extent the bankruptcy court addresses
particular issues of fact or law bearing on those adverse claims in order to
resolve some other summary/core matter properly before the court. 277
A. The Wellness Litigation as an Illustrative Example
In order to understand how the Supreme Court’s existing summary-plenary
jurisprudence can be used to resolve difficult cases like Wellness, it is worth
recounting, in some detail, the litigation in that case that required resolution in
the bankruptcy court. 278
1. The Pre-Bankruptcy Federal Court Litigation
The protracted litigation that produced the Wellness decision spanned more
than a decade and ultimately involved numerous federal courts in two different
274

Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1952 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See infra Part III.B.1.
276 See infra Part III.B.2.
277 See infra Part III.B.3.
278 The description of the Wellness litigation that follows is taken from the various published judicial
opinions cited herein.
275
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circuits, as well as an Illinois state court. Wellness International Network, Ltd.
was a manufacturer of health and wellness products, and Wellness had a
distributorship agreement with Richard Sharif. That relationship soured,
though, and in 2003 Sharif and others sued Wellness and its founders
(collectively, “Wellness”) in federal district court in the Northern District of
Illinois claiming that Wellness was running a pyramid scheme and seeking
damages of nearly $1 million. Wellness successfully moved to compel
arbitration of some of the claims asserted in that suit, 279 and the court dismissed
the remaining claims without prejudice pursuant to forum-selection clauses in
the parties’ contracts. 280 Sharif and his co-plaintiffs then refiled their remaining
claims in federal district court in the Northern District of Texas.
Sharif and his co-plaintiffs initiated no discovery in their Texas suit and
repeatedly ignored Wellness’s discovery requests, for which they were
ultimately sanctioned by a default judgment being entered against them. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed that default judgment with the following observation:
After this appeal was dismissed for Appellants’ failure to order a
transcript timely and make financial arrangements with the court
reporter, it was [subsequently] reinstated . . . . A review of the record
on appeal demonstrates that Appellants’ untimely performance in this
court mirrors a lengthy history in the district court of dilatoriness and
hollow posturing interspersed with periods of non-performance or
insubstantial performance and compliance by Appellants and their
counsel, leaving the unmistakable impression that they have no
purpose other than to prolong this contumacious litigation for
purposes of harassment or delay, or both. The time is long overdue to
terminate Appellants’ feckless litigation at the obvious cost of time
and money to the Defendants by affirming all rulings of the district
court but remanding the case to that court for the reinstatement of its
consideration of Appellees’ motion for attorney’s fees. 281

On remand, the district court sanctioned Sharif and his co-plaintiffs by
awarding Wellness over $650,000 in attorney’s fees. Wellness’s attempts to
collect that judgment are what led to Sharif’s bankruptcy filing and the
bankruptcy litigation that wound its way into the Supreme Court.
Wellness served Sharif with post-judgment discovery requests in the Texas
litigation, which Sharif ignored. On Wellness’s motion, the Texas district court
279
280
281

See Sharif v. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 376 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2004).
See Muzumdar v. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 438 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 2006).
Sharif v. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 273 Fed. Appx. 316, 317 (5th Cir. 2008).
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ordered Sharif to respond to that discovery and to appear for a judgment
debtor’s examination. Sharif failed to do either and was ultimately arrested and
held for contempt. Upon Sharif’s promise to comply with Wellness’s discovery
requests and to pay Wellness’s additional costs and attorney’s fees (embodied
in an order to do so), Sharif was released on his own recognizance. Sharif,
however, also ignored that order and, rather than comply, filed chapter 7 two
weeks later, on February 24, 2009, in the Northern District of Illinois. 282
2. The Bankruptcy Litigation
Sharif’s bankruptcy schedules listed as his creditors several members of
Sharif’s family (to whom he allegedly owed a total of $271,000 on
undocumented loans) and Wellness. The only creditor to file a proof of claim
was Wellness.
The initial § 341 official meeting of creditors 283 was held on March 25,
2009. At that meeting, Wellness and the chapter 7 trustee asked Sharif about a
2002 loan application they had obtained, pursuant to which Sharif had
procured a bank loan based upon Sharif’s representations in the application
that he owned various assets worth in the aggregate nearly $5.4 million (the
“Loan Assets”). The chapter 7 trustee continued the § 341 meeting until April
21 to give Sharif time to provide documents regarding the Loan Assets.
At the continued § 341 meeting in April 2009, though, Sharif did not
provide the requested documents. Rather, Sharif maintained that he never
owned the Loan Assets, that he lied on the 2002 loan application, that the Loan
Assets were owned by a trust (the “Soad Wattar Trust”) for which he was
merely the trustee, and that the beneficiaries of that trust were his mother
(Soad Wattar) and his sister (Ragda Sharifeh). Wellness and the chapter 7
trustee, therefore, requested documents regarding the Soad Wattar Trust, and
the chapter 7 trustee continued the § 341 meeting until June 3 to allow Sharif
time to provide the requested documents. 284
At the continued § 341 meeting in June, though, Sharif did not provide any
documents regarding the Soad Wattar Trust. Sharif then requested a protective
order for documents relating to the Loan Assets and the Soad Wattar Trust,

282 See generally Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 755–56 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussing
factual and procedural background), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
283 See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2012).
284 See generally Wellness, 727 F.3d at 756–57 (discussing factual and procedural background).
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which the bankruptcy court denied. On the chapter 7 trustee’s motion, the court
also ordered Sharif to turn over to the chapter 7 trustee documentation
regarding the Loan Assets and the Soad Wattar Trust, but Sharif did not
comply. 285
a. The Wellness Adversary Proceeding
On August 24, 2009, Wellness filed an adversary proceeding against Sharif
objecting to Sharif’s discharge under Bankruptcy Code § 727(a)(2)–(5). 286 One
count of Wellness’s complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the Soad
Wattar Trust was the alter ego of Sharif and, thus, was property of Sharif’s
bankruptcy estate. Another count of the complaint sought to deny Sharif a
discharge on the basis that he had concealed that property of the estate (the
Soad Wattar Trust assets) with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors
and the chapter 7 trustee. 287
In that adversary proceeding, a by-then “familiar pattern of discovery
evasion [by Sharif] ensued.” 288 On Wellness’s motion, the bankruptcy court
ordered Sharif to fully comply with all outstanding discovery requests,
expressly stating that if he did not do so by April 28, 2010, a default judgment
would be entered against him. Sharif produced some documents and sat for a
deposition, but he did not fully comply with his obligation to produce all
documents relating to the Loan Assets and the Soad Wattar Trust. 289
After an evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy court found that Sharif had
violated the court’s discovery order and entered a default judgment against him
on all counts. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court (1) denied Sharif a discharge
pursuant to Code § 727(a)(2)–(5), and (2) declared that “(i) the Soad Wattar
Trust no longer existed and (ii) that the trust’s assets became property of
[Sharif’s] bankruptcy estate as of the commencement of [Sharif’s] bankruptcy
case.” 290

285 See generally Sharifeh v. Fox (In re Sharif), 457 B.R. 702, 710–12 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011) (discussing
factual and procedural background).
286 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)–(5).
287 See generally Sharif, 457 B.R. at 708–09 (discussing counts of the complaint).
288 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1941 (2015).
289 See generally Wellness, 727 F.3d at 757–58 (discussing factual and procedural background).
290 Sharif, 457 B.R. at 731 (discussing July 6, 2010 default judgment).
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b. Ragda Sharifeh’s Request to Intervene
Sharif’s sister, Ragda Sharifeh, by separate motions (1) sought to intervene
in Wellness’s adversary proceeding to protect her interests as purported
beneficiary of the Soad Wattar Trust, 291 and (2) also sought to vacate the
default judgment insofar as it declared “that the Soad Wattar Trust is the
Debtor’s alter ego.” 292 Both motions alleged (1) that Sharifeh became the
successor beneficiary of the Soad Wattar Trust upon the death of her and
Sharif’s mother in 2010, and (2) that she became the successor trustee of the
Soad Wattar Trust after Sharif’s 2010 resignation as trustee. The court,
however, denied both motions and specifically found against Sharifeh with
respect to both of her allegations.
In particular, with respect to Sharifeh’s allegation that she was the
successor beneficiary of the Soad Wattar Trust, the bankruptcy court found, as
a factual matter, that “[h]er unsupported allegation will be given no weight . . .
as she has presented neither testimony nor documents in support of this
assertion.” 293 Moreover, the court concluded, as a matter of law, that even if
she were the successor beneficiary, that would provide her no standing to
participate in the adversary proceeding because under Illinois law
“[b]eneficiaries can not [sic] act on behalf of a trust. . . . The trust has to be
represented by its trustee, not its beneficiary,” 294 and thus, “a trust beneficiary
cannot sue or be sued regarding the trust.” 295
Likewise, with respect to Sharifeh’s allegation that she was the successor
trustee of the Soad Wattar Trust, the bankruptcy court found as a factual matter
that “Sharifeh failed to produce any evidence that she is the successor trustee
of the Soad Wattar Trust.” 296 Moreover, the court also concluded “that her
assertion lacks any legal basis,” 297 given her acknowledgment that Sharif was
the trustee both on the date of the filing of his bankruptcy petition, February
24, 2009, and on the date that the bankruptcy court issued its default judgment
declaring the Soad Wattar Trust to be Sharif’s alter ego, July 6, 2010. Thus, in
its July 6 default judgment ruling, the bankruptcy court not only held that
“[t]he trust’s assets became property of the Debtor’s estate as of the
291
292
293
294
295
296
297

See In re Sharif, 447 B.R. 853, 854 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011).
In re Sharif, 446 B.R. 870, 884 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011).
446 B.R. at 882.
447 B.R. at 866.
446 B.R. at 882.
447 B.R. at 867.
446 B.R. at 882.
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commencement of the bankruptcy case,” the court also decided that “[a]s of
July 6, 2010, . . . the trust no longer existed.” 298 Sharif’s alleged subsequent
resignation would, therefore, be a futile gesture with no legal significance
whatsoever and could not provide Sharifeh any kind of retroactive standing to
try to undo the court’s ruling, after the fact. 299 Even if she was the successor
beneficiary of the trust, she was fully bound by the court’s final judgment in
litigation to which her trustee was a party.
Sharif appealed the July 6, 2010 default judgment entered against him in
Wellness’s adversary proceeding, and it was that appeal that ultimately made
its way to the Supreme Court. 300 And as the Wellness Supreme Court dissenters
recognized, the Court’s existing and extensive summary-plenary jurisprudence
already contains a highly developed structure for analyzing whether it was
constitutionally permissible (as a traditionally summary “core” matter) for the
non-Article III bankruptcy court to enter that default judgment.
B. The Summary-Plenary Divide
The summary-plenary distinction was constructed through in rem
conceptions of the property in the rightful possession or control of the
bankrupt’s estate created upon commencement of a bankruptcy case regarding
that debtor. 301 Consistent with the historical purposes of the “bankruptcy”
proceedings, 302 “summary” jurisdiction extended to all proceedings necessary
to administer that property in the rightful possession or control of the estate for
the benefit of the bankrupt’s creditors—what the Weidhorn v. Levy Court
referred to as “the ordinary administrative proceedings in bankruptcy and such
controversial matters as arise therein and are in effect a part thereof.” 303

298

447 B.R. at 867.
In the absence of a sufficient showing of proper grounds to vacate that judgment under FED. R.
BANKR. P. 7062 (incorporating FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)), which the bankruptcy court found Sharifeh had neither
alleged nor established. See 446 B.R. at 884.
300 See Sharifeh v. Fox, Nos. 11 C 8811, et al., 2012 WL 469980 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2012), aff’d in part,
vacated in part sub nom., Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S.
Ct. 1932 (2015).
301 See generally Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 122–30.
302 “Since the Roman law of cession (cessio bonorum), bankruptcy law has concerned itself with transfer
of a debtor’s property to the debtor’s creditors. The mechanism for such transfer in Anglo-American law has
been the construct of a bankrupt’s ‘estate,’ vested in trust to a representative of the creditor collective.”
Brubaker, A General Theory, supra note 169, at 817 (footnotes omitted).
303 253 U.S. 268, 273 (1920).
299
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If the estate’s representative “were required to sue someone to recover
money or property for the estate, however, . . . such an action required an
ordinary formal suit in the appropriate superior court.” 304 For example:
[A] debtor’s property [included in the estate] often included things
not within the possession of the court, such as a disputed cause of
action [for money damages] against a third party or tangible property
held under a substantial claim of right by a third party, a so-called
adverse claimant. A court of bankruptcy had no summary jurisdiction
to adjudicate [such] disputes with adverse claimants. Such a dispute
could be resolved only by an ordinary civil action (a plenary
suit) . . . . 305

For most bankruptcy proceedings, it is very easy to determine on which
side of the summary-plenary divide the proceeding sits. The alter-ego cause of
action in Wellness, though, requires a more nuanced consideration of
summary-plenary doctrine. Moreover, because no one asserted a right to final
judgment from an Article III court while that action was before the bankruptcy
court, the bankruptcy judge considered none of the issues and findings
necessary to determine whether the Wellness alter-ego action was or was not a
traditional summary “core” matter. As the Wellness dissenters noted, then,
such a determination would have to be “an inquiry for the Bankruptcy Court on
remand,” 306 which was, of course, mooted by the majority’s alternative
resolution of the case. 307 The reported opinions in Wellness, though, suggest
several fruitful lines of inquiry for such a case and demonstrate how the
analytical structure for resolving even more difficult core-noncore cases like
Wellness already exists in the Supreme Court’s summary-plenary
jurisprudence.
In Wellness, the proceeding at issue was an alter-ego action to have the
Soad Wattar Trust, for which the debtor Sharif served as the trustee when he
filed bankruptcy, declared to be a sham—the alter ego of Sharif himself—
thereby making all of the assets nominally owned by the Soad Wattar Trust

304

Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 124.
Ralph Brubaker, Nondebtor Releases and Injunctions in Chapter 11: Revisiting Jurisdictional Precepts
and the Forgotten Callaway v. Benton Case, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 23–24 (1998).
306 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1953 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see
Harris v. Brundage Co., 305 U.S. 160, 163 (1938) (“In every case the bankruptcy court has power, in the first
instance, to determine whether it has that actual or constructive possession which is essential to its jurisdiction
to proceed.”); Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 433 (1924) (noting that “every court must
have power to determine, in the first instance, whether it has jurisdiction to proceed”).
307 See supra note 104.
305
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property of Sharif’s bankruptcy estate available for distribution to Sharif’s
creditors, such as Wellness. To the extent that such an action would require
adjudication of the interests of third parties in such property (such as the
named beneficiaries of the trust, Sharif’s mother and sister), one might be
tempted to think that this action was a prototypical traditional plenary suit.
There are several reasons to suspect, though, that a non-core plenary suit may
not have been required in Wellness, and thus, that the bankruptcy court may
well have had constitutional authority to finally adjudicate that alter-ego claim
(as a traditionally summary, now-core matter), even without litigant consent.
1. Actual or Constructive Possession by the Debtor
It is axiomatic that upon commencement of a bankruptcy case, the
bankruptcy estate automatically and by operation of law succeeds to all of the
debtor’s interests in property, under the supervision and control of the
bankruptcy court. Thus, the filing of the petition in bankruptcy causes all
property of the debtor to pass into the rightful custody of the bankruptcy court,
under the control of the estate’s representative (the bankruptcy trustee), an
officer of the court. 308 As Justice Fuller famously stated in Mueller v. Nugent,
“the filing of the petition is a caveat to all the world, and in effect an
attachment and injunction” pursuant to which “title to the bankrupt’s property
bec[omes] vested in the trustee with actual or constructive possession, and
placed in the custody of the bankruptcy court.” 309 Summary jurisdiction was
conceived as a species of in rem jurisdiction over all that “property in the
actual or constructive possession of the court and proceedings to administer
that property for the benefit of creditors.” 310
Moreover, if the debtor resisted turnover of property to the bankruptcy
trustee, the trustee was not required to initiate a plenary suit against the debtor
to gain actual physical possession of that property. A debtor’s mere possession
of property is, in itself, an “interest in property” to which a debtor’s bankruptcy
308 See Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigation: A Critical Reappraisal of NonDebtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 959, 1043 n.314 [hereinafter Brubaker,
Bankruptcy Injunctions].
309 184 U.S. 1, 14 (1902); see also Bank v. Sherman, 101 U.S. 403, 406 (1879) (“The filing of the petition
was a caveat to all the world. It was in effect an attachment and injunction.”).
310 Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions, supra note 308, at 1043 n.314; see Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber
Co., 282 U.S. 734, 737–38 (1931) (upon commencement of a bankruptcy case, “title to the bankrupt’s property
vests in the trustee with actual or constructive possession, and is placed in the custody of the bankruptcy
court,” which “is competent to hear and determine all questions respecting title, possession, and control of the
property”).
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estate succeeds upon commencement of a bankruptcy case. 311 Thus, in
applying their general equitable powers, “courts of bankruptcy . . . fashioned
the summary turnover procedure as one necessary to accomplish their function
of administration.” 312 Injunctive turnover proceedings are the means by which
the bankruptcy court enforces its right of “possession, custody,” and “control”
of property of the estate. 313
As nicely explained by a World War II-era commentator:
The trustee in bankruptcy is vested, upon his qualification, with
title to all the non-exempt property which belonged to the bankrupt
on the date the petition was filed.[ 314] But whereas this title placidly
comes to rest with him by operation of law, strenuous effort on the
part of the trustee may be required to gather together all the assets of
the estate, wherever they may be found. His search for missing
property may lead him to the bankrupt or to third parties, often the
311 See generally Ralph Brubaker, Turnover, Adequate Protection, and the Automatic Stay (Part I):
Origins and Evolution of the Turnover Power, 33 BANKR. L. LETTER No. 8, Aug. 2013, at 1, 5–6 [hereinafter
Brubaker, Turnover (Part I)]; Ralph Brubaker, Turnover, Adequate Protection, and the Automatic Stay (Part
II): Who Is “Exercising Control” Over What?, 33 BANKR. L. LETTER No. 9, Sept. 2013, at 1, 4–6 [hereinafter
Brubaker, Turnover (Part II)].
312 Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 62–63 (1948) (emphasis added).
313 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2012); see id. § 521(a)(4) (setting forth debtor’s obligation to “surrender to the
trustee all property of the estate”); id. § 105(a) (“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”). When an entity (including the debtor)
refuses to surrender property of the estate to the trustee, an injunctive order compelling turnover “has been
sustained as an appropriate and necessary step in enforcing the Bankruptcy Act.” Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. at
63. Justice Brandeis stated the controlling principle as follows:

To protect its jurisdiction from interference, th[e] court may issue an injunction. The power is not
peculiar to bankruptcy or to the federal courts. It is an application of the general principle that,
where a court of competent jurisdiction has, through its officers, taken property into its
possession, . . . the court may . . . issue all writs necessary to protect its possession from physical
interference.
Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U.S. 610, 615 (1934). The injunctive nature of a turnover order is made clear by the
fact that failure to comply with a turnover order is punishable as a civil contempt. See Oriel v. Russell, 278
U.S. 358, 363–67 (1929) (stating that there is “no doubt that a motion to commit the bankrupt for failure to
obey an order of the court to turn over to the receiver in bankruptcy the property of the bankrupt is a civil
contempt,” and “this sort of an order of ‘turnover’ finds its analogy in the inquiry in contempt proceedings for
violating an injunction issued by a court of general jurisdiction”); Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. at 13 (stating
that “if the [turnover] order . . . was in itself a lawful order, the power of the district court to commit” the
person in possession of the bankrupt’s money “until he surrendered the money to the trustee, or otherwise
satisfied the trustee with respect thereto, was unquestionable under . . . the general jurisdiction of the court to
enforce its orders in the collection of assets”).
314 The current statute provides that a debtor’s bankruptcy estate, of which the trustee is representative,
includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11
U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).

BRUBAKER GALLEYSPROOFS3

2016]

12/26/2016 12:47 PM

NON-ARTICLE III ADJUDICATION

79

bankrupt’s friends or relatives or officers of a bankrupt corporation,
who are found to be concealing or withholding money or goods
which are part of the estate in bankruptcy. In such circumstances the
trustee, as the chosen representative of the creditors,[ 315] has the right
and duty to vindicate his title and right of possession. To that end, he
may effectively institute a summary proceeding to compel those who
have the property to surrender it to him. This form of proceeding is
commonly known as the “turnover proceeding.” 316

As emphasized in the above quotations, the Supreme Court conceived of
the turnover process as a quintessential summary proceeding “heard and
determined by the [non-Article III] referee in bankruptcy.” 317 And that
summary turnover procedure is undoubtedly what Congress was referring to in
the current grant of “core” jurisdiction for non-Article III bankruptcy judges to
enter “orders to turn over property of the estate.” 318 Indeed, because the entire
turnover procedure and the limits thereon are themselves products of, and
defined by the limitations on, the traditional summary bankruptcy process,
turnover proceedings have always stood at the boundary between summary and
plenary matters. Thus, the appropriate scope of turnover proceedings
ultimately helps to define the full expanse of traditionally summary matters. 319
315

The current statute provides that the trustee “is the representative of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 323(a).
Joseph W. McGovern, Aspects of the Turnover Proceeding in Bankruptcy, 9 FORDHAM L. REV. 313,
313 (1940) (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). The turnover procedure “is a judicial innovation by which
the court seeks efficiently and expeditiously to accomplish ends prescribed by the statute, which, however, left
the means largely to judicial ingenuity.” Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. at 61. “[A] vast body of judicial authority
has grown up which not only sanctions this type of proceeding but has defined the basis and the consequences
of it.” Max Schwartz, Turnover and Contempt Proceedings in the Light of the History of Maggio v. Zeitz, 5
UCLA L. REV. 75, 75 (1958). And use of the turnover process by federal courts dates from the earliest days of
the Republic. See Brubaker, Justice Story and Bankruptcy Injunctions, supra note 200, at 93–94 & n.96.
317 McGovern, supra note 316, at 313.
318 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E) (2012); see Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2171 n.7
(2014) (stating that “[i]n using the term ‘core,’ Congress tracked the [Marathon] plurality’s use of the same
term as a description of those claims that fell within the scope of the historical” summary bankruptcy
jurisdiction); Reed v. Nathan, 558 B.R. 800, 816–17 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (“Simply put, ‘the principles
applicable to determine jurisdiction over turnover actions under the 1898 [Act] remain ‘perfectly appropriate
to distinguish between a ‘core’ turnover proceeding and a ‘non-core’’” state-law action (quoting In re Prosser,
Civ. No. 2011-113, 2013 WL 996367, at *4 (D. V.I. Mar. 14, 2013) (quoting Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d
434, 444 (3d Cir. 1990))); Jones v. Anderson (In re Jones), Nos. CC-06-1105-MoBK, et al., 2006 WL
6810992, at *4 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Dec. 6, 2006) (holding that a turnover proceeding is core under § 157(b)(2)(E)
because “the action for turnover . . . has always been considered within the ‘summary’ or ‘core’ jurisdiction of
a bankruptcy court” (quoting Global Int’l Airways Corp. v. Azima (In re Global Int’l Airways Corp.), 76 B.R.
700, 705 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987)).
319 See 4 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 62:2, at 62–5 to –6 (3d ed. 2015); Brubaker,
Turnover (Part I), supra note 311, at 3 (noting that “this injunctive turnover power directly implicated the
historical summary-plenary distinction that pervaded multiple dimensions of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
and procedure”). Thus, the only section of the pre-Code edition of the Collier treatise devoted to “Turnover
316
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A turnover proceeding was properly considered a summary matter, because
“[t]he possession . . . essential to [summary] jurisdiction[] need not be actual.
Constructive possession is sufficient. It exists where the property was in the
physical possession of the debtor at the time of the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy, but was not delivered by him to the trustee.” 320 Constructive
possession is also the operative principle with respect to property that cannot
be physically possessed. “Where the character of the property is such that it is
not capable of tangible or actual physical custody, constructive possession will
suffice to confer summary jurisdiction upon the bankruptcy court regarding
such property.” 321 In such cases, control of the property at issue is often a more
useful inquiry than possession, which is why the Supreme Court often phrased
the determinative inquiry in terms of whether the property at issue was “in the
possession or control of the court or of the bankrupt . . . at the time of petition
filed.” 322 As Judge Learned Hand cogently opined, the “nature of the doctrine”
of constructive possession “depends merely upon possession in the natural
sense” of being “in control of the property de facto,” with the ability to
“exclude all others.” 323
These basic principles would likely go a long way toward determining
whether the bankruptcy court in Wellness had core jurisdiction over the
property at issue in Wellness’s alter-ego action against the debtor, Sharif.
Sharif’s admission that he served as trustee of the Soad Wattar Trust on the
date of his bankruptcy petition suggests that he may have had actual possession
or control of trust assets on the petition date, which would establish
constructive possession in the court of those trust assets. 324 Indeed, if the only
Orders” was set forth within the topic entitled “Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Court in Summary Proceedings.” 2
COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 72, ¶ 23.10.
320 Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 432 (1924). See generally Brubaker, Turnover (Part
I), supra note 311, at 3–4. “Since in the turnover proceeding the trustee is seeking the surrender of property
alleged to be in the actual physical possession of [the debtor or] a third party, it is apparent that it is
constructive possession of the bankrupt’s property which there forms the foundation for the exercise of the
court’s summary jurisdiction.” McGovern, supra note 316, at 314–15.
321 2 COLLIER (14th ed.), supra note 72, ¶ 23.05[4], at 486.
322 Weidhorn v. Levy, 253 U.S. 268, 272 (1920). Indeed, the currently codified statutory automatic stay
(in Code § 362(a)(3)) protects both “possession” and “control” of property of the estate from any outside
interference. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2012); see Brubaker, Turnover (Part II), supra note 311, at 1–4.
323 Palmer v. Warren, 108 F.2d 164, 166 (2d Cir. 1939), aff’d, 310 U.S. 132 (1940).
324 While a debtor’s bankruptcy estate obviously does not succeed to fee simple ownership of property the
debtor merely holds in trust for another, the estate does succeed to whatever rights and interests the debtor (as
trustee) has in the trust property (e.g., legal title, right of possession and control, etc.). See 4A COLLIER (14th
ed.), supra note 72, ¶ 70.25, at 339–40 (noting that “[t]he rule is elementary that a trustee in bankruptcy (or
reorganization) succeeds . . . to the title and rights in the property that the debtor possessed,” including cases
“[t]herefore, where the bankrupt or debtor was in the possession of property impressed with a trust”).

BRUBAKER GALLEYSPROOFS3

2016]

12/26/2016 12:47 PM

NON-ARTICLE III ADJUDICATION

81

way for the chapter 7 trustee to obtain possession and control of those trust
assets was to divest possession and control from the trustee (debtor Sharif),
then the bankruptcy court had constructive possession of those trust assets,
with core jurisdiction to adjudicate anyone and everyone’s rights in those
assets.
As Judge Hand insightfully observed, “[t]he reason lying back of the whole
doctrine” of possession and constructive possession “is practical rather than
conceptual.” 325 In gathering up all of the debtor’s property for liquidation and
distribution to creditors, from whom must the trustee obtain that property? As
the Supreme Court noted in May v. Henderson, “[i]f the bankrupt . . . is not
shown to possess or control the specific property which is the subject of [a]
summary order,” a summary order for the debtor to turn over such property is
not only improper, but also does the trustee no good whatsoever, and “[a] court
of bankruptcy should not make useless orders.” 326 Thus, if the property the
trustee seeks is in the possession or control of a third party, who asserts a
substantial claim of right to keep that property as his or her own, then “a
plenary suit must be brought, either at law or in equity, by the trustee, in which
the adverse claim . . . can be tried and adjudicated.” 327
If the property the trustee seeks is in the possession or control of the debtor,
however, no such plenary suit is necessary; that property is already in the
constructive possession of the bankruptcy court, with full power not only to
compel the debtor to relinquish possession or control to the trustee, but also to
finally adjudicate third parties’ adverse claims to that property. “[I]f the
property were in the custody of the bankruptcy court or its officer, any
controversy raised by an adverse claimant . . . might be determined on
summary proceedings in the bankruptcy court, and would fall within the
jurisdiction of the referee.” 328 As Justice Brandeis noted: “This is but an
application of the well-recognized rule that, when a court of competent
jurisdiction takes possession of property through its officers, . . . the court . . .
is competent to hear and determine all questions respecting title, possession,

325

Palmer v. Warren, 108 F.2d at 166.
268 U.S. 111, 120 (1925).
327 Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U.S. 102, 113 (1910); see also Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S.
426, 433–34 (1924).
328 Weidhorn v. Levy, 253 U.S. 268, 271–72 (1920); see also Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264
U.S. at 433.
326
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and control of the property.” 329 Indeed, modern courts uniformly recognize that
determining whether the property at issue is, in fact, property of the estate is an
integral part of a core turnover action. 330
That the alter-ego action at issue in Wellness would adjudicate substantial
adverse claims of third-party beneficiaries (Sharif’s mother and sister) to
equitable ownership of the trust assets, then, is not necessarily determinative as
to whether the bankruptcy court had core jurisdiction to adjudicate that action.
Moreover, that the debtor may have had nothing more than bare legal title to
those trust assets (as trustee) is immaterial. The determinative inquiry is not
who actually “owns” the property at issue; that may well be what the
underlying action itself must determine (as in Wellness). Rather, the initial,
potentially determinative inquiry is whether the debtor (and thus the court
itself) had possession or control of the property at issue. As the Supreme Court
stated in Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. 331—another case in which the
action at issue would determine who “owned” the property at issue:
Bankruptcy courts have summary jurisdiction to adjudicate
controversies relating to property over which they have actual or
constructive possession. And the test of this jurisdiction is not title in
[nor ownership of] but possession by the bankrupt at the time of the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy.[ 332] Here, the trustee succeeded to
the physical possession, custody and control of the [property at issue]
which the [debtor] had enjoyed at the time of bankruptcy. . . . [T]he
jurisdiction thus acquired by the bankruptcy court “extends * * * to
the adjudication of questions respecting the title [or ownership].” 333

329 Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734, 737–38 (1931) (emphasis added); accord Ex parte
Baldwin, 291 U.S. 610, 615 (1934) (“Having possession, the court may . . . determine all questions respecting
the same.” (emphasis added)).
330 See 5 COLLIER (16th ed.), supra note 133, ¶ 542.03, at 542–9 to –10.
331 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
332 While turnover jurisdiction under pre-Code law turned on possession as of the petition date, the
Bankruptcy Code seems to have expanded the bankruptcy estate’s possessory rights, by imposing a turnover
obligation on any “entity” (including the debtor) “in possession, custody, or control, during the case, of
property” of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2012) (emphasis added); see United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.,
462 U.S. 198, 207 (1983) (noting that the explicit “reach of § 542(a)” does not “require[] that the debtor hold a
possessory interest in the property at the commencement of the [bankruptcy] proceedings. . . . In effect,
§ 542(a) grants to the estate a possessory interest in certain property of the debtor that was not held by the
debtor at the commencement of reorganization proceedings.”); cf. 5 COLLIER (16th ed.), supra note 133,
¶ 542.03[1], at 542–11 to –12 (discussing disagreement in the courts as to whether the “during the case”
language overturns pre-Code Supreme Court case law holding “that possession or control of the property by a
defendant at the time of a turnover proceeding is required to compel turnover”).
333 Thompson, 309 U.S. at 481–82 (quoting Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U.S. at 616).
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Merely concluding that the debtor Sharif, as trustee of the Soad Wattar
Trust, had possession or control of trust assets would not, of course, make
those trust assets property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate; whether they were
or not is what the underlying alter-ego action itself would determine, on the
merits. The debtor Sharif’s possession or control of trust assets as trustee of the
Soad Watter Trust, though, would give the bankruptcy court core jurisdiction
to finally adjudicate ownership of those trust assets through that alter-ego
action. And that is true even if that alter-ego action would adjudicate
substantial adverse claims of third-party beneficiaries (Sharif’s mother and
sister) to equitable ownership of those assets.
Note, then, how the Supreme Court’s summary-plenary jurisprudence
remained faithful to the English origins of that distinction prevailing at the
time of the Founding. 334 The bankruptcy court has summary (now-core)
jurisdiction to adjudicate all proceedings to administer property within the
rightful possession and control of the estate’s representative, including
adjudication of all claims regarding that property. Plenary/non-core suits are
necessary only when the estate representative seeks to recover money or
property from an adverse claimant. “Recognizing the summary-plenary line as
the operative constitutional boundary in bankruptcy” does, therefore, “have the
virtue of consistency with historical practice” and does “afford lower courts
(some of) the guidance they’ve long wanted.” 335
2. A Substantial Adverse Claim by a Third Party
In determining whether the bankruptcy court would have core jurisdiction
to finally adjudicate the alter-ego action at issue in Wellness, therefore, the
initial inquiry would be who had possession or control of the trust property. If
the trust property included financial assets, for example, those assets might
well be in the possession or control of third parties (such as banks or other
financial institutions). If, however, those financial assets were held for the
account of the debtor Sharif (as trustee for the Soad Wattar Trust), they would
still seem to come within the summary/core jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court.
It is well settled that property or money held adversely to the
bankrupt can only be recovered in a plenary suit and not by a
summary proceeding in a bankruptcy court. But property held or
334
335

See Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 122–26.
In re Renewable Energy Dev. Corp., 792 F.3d 1274, 1282 (10th Cir. 2015).
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acquired by others for [the] account of the bankrupt is subject to a
summary order of the court which may direct an accounting and a
payment over to the trustee or receiver appointed by the bankruptcy
court. 336

If any of the property at issue was not in the possession, custody, or control
of the debtor, constructive possession of that property (essential to
core/summary turnover jurisdiction regarding that property) is determined by
whether the third party with possession, custody, or control raises a so-called
“adverse claim” superior to that of the debtor or the estate, 337 entitling that third
party to keep the property. “To the extent a debtor’s property [i]s in the
possession of a third party raising no adverse claim to retain possession, . . . a
federal bankruptcy court c[an] summarily issue an injunctive turnover order
against that party.” 338
In Wellness, after the death (during the bankruptcy case) of debtor Sharif’s
mother, apparently the only party purporting to claim trust assets adversely to
the debtor was Sharif’s sister, who eventually sought to intervene in the alterego action. 339 Of course, an adverse claim to those trust assets by Sharif’s sister
would deprive the bankruptcy court of summary/core jurisdiction only if
Sharif’s sister or someone holding for her account (and not Sharif or someone
holding for Sharif’s account) were in possession or control of trust assets. 340

336

May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. 111, 115 (1925) (citations omitted).
In the Whiting Pools decision, the Supreme Court interpreted Code § 542(a) as expanding the estate’s
possessory rights in reorganization proceedings with respect to property held by a secured creditor by virtue of
a pre-bankruptcy repossession, even though such a secured creditor would be considered an “adverse
claimant” to the property at issue, with rights superior to those of the debtor, under pre-Code law. See 11
U.S.C. § 542(a); Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 207; Brubaker, Turnover (Part I), supra note 311, at 4–7. Because
Code § 542(a) changed the relative possessory rights as between such a secured creditor and the bankruptcy
estate, such a secured creditor could no longer be considered an “adverse claimant” to the property at issue, the
property at issue would now have to be considered within the “constructive possession” of the bankruptcy
court, and the bankruptcy court would have core jurisdiction in a turnover proceeding against the secured
creditor.
338 Brubaker, Turnover (Part I), supra note 311, at 3 (emphasis added); see Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S.
1, 14–15 (1902) (holding that the referee had summary jurisdiction to enter turnover order against bankrupt’s
agent because “[t]here was no pretense that . . . this money of the bankrupt . . . was held subject to any adverse
claim, or that the right or title thereto had been passed over to another”).
339 See supra Part III.A.2.b.
340 See Weidhorn v. Levy, 253 U.S. 268, 272 (1920) (noting that “a plenary suit was necessary” because
“the controversy related to property not in possession or control of the court or of the bankrupt or any one
representing him at the time of the petition filed, . . . but in the actual possession of the [defendant] under an
adverse claim of ownership”).
337
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Even assuming that were the case, 341 it is still unclear whether a “substantial”
adverse claim to the trust assets—necessary to deprive the bankruptcy court of
constructive possession and corresponding summary/core turnover
jurisdiction—was ever raised in Wellness.
In that regard, the Supreme Court in Harrison v. Chamberlain 342 nicely
summarized the controlling principles as to whether a third party in possession
or control of property has adequately raised an adverse claim that deprives the
bankruptcy court of summary/core turnover jurisdiction:
It is well settled that a court of bankruptcy is without jurisdiction
to adjudicate in a summary proceeding a controversy in reference to
property held adversely to the bankrupt estate, without the consent of
the adverse claimant; but resort must be had by the trustee to a
plenary suit. However, the court is not ousted of its jurisdiction by the
mere assertion of an adverse claim; but, having the power in the first
instance to determine whether it has jurisdiction to proceed, the court
may enter upon a preliminary inquiry to determine whether the
adverse claim is real and substantial or merely colorable. And if
found to be merely colorable the court may then proceed to
adjudicate the merits summarily; but if found to be real and
substantial it must decline to determine the merits and dismiss the
summary proceeding. 343

And “as to the test to be applied in determining whether an adverse claim is
substantial or merely colorable,” the Harrison v. Chamberlain Court went on
to state:
[I]t is to be deemed of a substantial character when the claimant’s
contention “discloses a contested matter of right, involving some fair
doubt and reasonable room for controversy,” in matters either of fact
or law; and is not to be held merely colorable unless the preliminary
inquiry shows that it is so unsubstantial and obviously insufficient,

341 Sharif, of course, would claim that he was holding for the account of his sister (who did claim
adversely). Since Sharif was the debtor, though, his possession or control (to which his estate rightfully
succeeds) should be sufficient to give the bankruptcy court constructive possession. See 2 COLLIER (14th ed.),
supra note 72, ¶ 23.05[2], at 474.3 (opining that summary jurisdiction exists even with respect to property “the
bankrupt holds merely as an agent” for another); 4A id. ¶ 70.07[1], at 85–86 (“[A]s between the bankrupt and
his trustee[,] the bankrupt cannot set up a third person’s title or right to justify a failure to turn over property or
to account for it. . . . The rule applies even to property which the bankrupt had held in trust.”).
342 271 U.S. 191 (1926).
343 Id. at 193–94 (citations omitted and emphasis added); see also May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. 111, 115–
16, 120 (1925); Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. at 15.
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either in fact or law, as to be plainly without color of merit, and a
mere pretense. 344

The Court also opined that “a claim is merely colorable if ‘on its face
made in bad faith and without any legal justification.’” 345
Using these same principles, then, if a defendant in even a Marathon- or
Stern-like suit fails to answer the complaint, for example, the complete failure
to assert any substantial defense on the merits would seem to give the
bankruptcy court core jurisdiction to enter a default judgment against the
defendant. 346 These principles also suggest a possible justification for core
jurisdiction over the bankruptcy court’s default judgment against Sharif on the
alter-ego claim in the Wellness case.
The putative adverse claimant in Wellness was debtor Sharif’s sister, as
purported beneficiary of the Soad Wattar Trust, whose alleged interest in the
property at issue was raised both by debtor Sharif and by Sharif’s sister herself,
through her request to intervene in the alter-ego action. 347 The bankruptcy
court, though, (1) entered a default judgment against Sharif on the alter-ego
claim for failure to fully comply with the court’s discovery order, and (2)
denied the requests of Sharif’s sister to intervene and to set aside the default
judgment because, inter alia, with respect to her allegation that she succeeded
to an interest in the trust assets upon her mother’s death, “[h]er unsupported
allegation will be given no weight . . . as she has presented neither testimony
nor documents in support of this assertion.” 348

344

Harrison v. Chamberlain, 271 U.S. at 194–95 (citation omitted).
Id. at 194 (quoting May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. at 119). The Supreme Court (via a Justice Douglas
opinion) applied these principles to an alter-ego action in Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S.
215 (1941), concluding that a referee’s findings “that the [pre-petition] transfer of the [debtor’s] property to the
[newly-formed family] corporation was not in good faith but was made for the purpose of placing the property
beyond the reach of [the debtor’s] creditors” made it “clear that [the] family corporation’s adverse claim is
merely colorable.” Id. at 216, 218.
346 Cf. Geron v. Peebler (In re Pali Holdings, Inc.), 488 B.R. 841, 851–53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(holding that the bankruptcy court had constitutional power to order turnover of amounts owing on promissory
note when defendant raised no substantial defenses).
347 Whether it was necessary to join Sharif’s sister as a defendant in the alter-ego action is a standing issue
determined by otherwise applicable state trust law. The bankruptcy court concluded that it was not necessary
to join Sharif’s sister because under Illinois law “beneficiaries can not [sic] act on behalf of a trust. . . . The
trust has to be represented by its trustee, not its beneficiary.” In re Sharif, 447 B.R. 853, 866 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2011). Thus, according to the bankruptcy court, “a trust beneficiary cannot sue or be sued regarding the trust.”
In re Sharif, 446 B.R. 870, 882 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011).
348 Sharif, 446 B.R. at 882; see supra Part III.A.2.
345
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Again, because no jurisdictional objection was raised before the bankruptcy
court, the bankruptcy judge made none of the inquiries or findings that would
be necessary to conclude whether the putative adverse claim to the property at
issue was “real and substantial” or “merely colorable.” The course of the
proceedings before the bankruptcy court, though, suggest that this could have
been a live issue had the jurisdictional objection been raised before the
bankruptcy court. 349
3. General Supplemental Summary/Core Jurisdiction
Another potential basis for core jurisdiction over the alter-ego claim in
Wellness can be found in the Supreme Court’s Katchen v. Landy 350 decision
(determining the appropriate scope of a referee’s summary jurisdiction), which
the Stern v. Marshall 351 majority relied on in its constitutional analysis and
treated as an Article III decision. 352 As I have explained at length before, the
reasoning of the Katchen v. Landy opinion contained a rationale for a general
and very broad doctrine of supplemental non-Article III adjudications. 353 While
Stern v. Marshall implicitly rejected the most expansive version of
supplemental non-Article III adjudications, the Stern decision was not a
wholesale “rejection of supplemental jurisdiction in the context of non-Article
III adjudications.” 354 Indeed, the counterclaim jurisdiction approved in both
Katchen and Stern indisputably is a species of supplemental jurisdiction: there
is no independent core jurisdiction over the counterclaim at issue as a standalone claim, yet core jurisdiction over that counterclaim nonetheless can exist
when it is joined and litigated with a core creditor claim. That is an application
of supplemental jurisdiction principles in the context of (and that expands the
permissible reach of) non-Article III bankruptcy-court adjudications.
Stern v. Marshall, then, did not reject (and indeed implicitly approved) the
application of supplemental jurisdiction to non-Article III adjudications. Stern
did, however, “circumscribe the necessary supplemental relationship” between

349 For a particularly thoughtful application of these principles of summary/core jurisdiction to a complex
turnover action, involving questions of both possession of the property at issue and the substantiality of
putative adverse claims thereto, see Reed v. Nathan, 558 B.R. 800, 814–20 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
350 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
351 564 U.S. 462 (2011).
352 See Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 150–57, 167–72; Brubaker, Bleak House (Part
II), supra note 2, at 3–6, 10–12.
353 See Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 167–72, 176–80.
354 Id. at 170–71.
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the claims at issue. 355 In that regard, “the most that Stern v. Marshall implicitly
admits is the possibility of supplemental core jurisdiction over common factual
and legal issues that are ‘necessary’ to adjudicate those matters historically
considered ‘summary’” 356—those that are “resolved in the process of ruling
on” 357 or “disposed of in passing on” 358 a traditionally summary, core matter.
And, of course, if supplemental jurisdiction principles are “properly applicable
to expand the jurisdiction of non-Article III tribunals,” as both Katchen and
Stern seem to necessarily imply, “those principles would obviously have
application in many bankruptcy contexts other than simply ‘counterclaims by
the estate against persons filing claims against the estate.’” 359—the context at
issue in both Katchen and Stern.
The applicability of such a doctrine of supplemental core jurisdiction was
raised in Wellness, but the Seventh Circuit rejected it by concluding that it only
has applicability to the particular core, traditionally summary matter at issue in
both Katchen and Stern: allowance or disallowance of a creditor’s claim
against a bankruptcy estate. 360 That is an incredibly cramped reading of
Katchen and Stern that is not necessarily warranted. The undue stinginess of
that approach is highlighted by courts’ widespread acceptance of supplemental
core jurisdiction, in the context of nondischargeability determinations, to enter
money judgment against the debtor personally on a debt declared
nondischargeable, 361 which is not a matter that is typically resolved through
allowance or disallowance of the creditor’s claim against the estate. 362 If
Stern’s “necessity” version of supplemental core jurisdiction applies to
355

Id. at 171.
Id. at 179.
357 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011).
358 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 333 n.9 (1966).
359 Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 178 (citation omitted).
360 See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 775 (7th Cir. 2013), rev’d on other grounds,
135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
361 See generally Deitz v. Ford (In re Deitz), 469 B.R. 11, 26–30 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (Markell, B.J.,
concurring), aff’d, 760 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2014); Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 178–180;
Brubaker, A General Theory, supra note 169, at 911–21; Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction to
Enter a Money Judgment on a Nondischargeable Debt: Exposing Pacor’s Deficiencies and the True
Supplemental Nature of Third-Party “Related To” Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 29 BANKR. L. LETTER No. 4, Apr.
2009, at 1, 8.
362 See Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 180 n.264; Brubaker, A General Theory, supra
note 169, at 915–16 n.600. Thus, the Ninth Circuit was simply incorrect when it asserted that “dischargeability
actions . . . are ‘necessarily resolved during the process of allowing or disallowing claims against the estate.’”
Deitz, 760 F.3d at 1039. Indeed, in most chapter 7 cases, including the Deitz case itself, creditors do not even
file claims against the estate (because it has no assets), so there are no creditor claims against the estate to
allow or disallow! See Deitz, 469 B.R at 27–28 (Markell, B.J., concurring).
356
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proceedings other than claims allowance proceedings (and there is no apparent
cogent reason why it should not), the Wellness litigation provides a nice
example of how it could give the bankruptcy court core jurisdiction over the
alter-ego claim at issue in that case.
The adversary proceeding at issue in Wellness objected to Sharif’s
discharge under Bankruptcy Code § 727(a)(2)–(5). 363 One count of the
complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the Soad Wattar Trust was the
alter-ego of Sharif and, thus, was property of Sharif’s bankruptcy estate.
Another count of the complaint sought to deny Sharif a discharge under Code
§ 727(a)(2) on the basis that he had concealed that “property of the debtor” or
“property of the estate” (the Soad Wattar Trust assets) with intent to hinder,
delay, and defraud his creditors and the chapter 7 trustee. 364
No one questioned the constitutionality of the bankruptcy court’s core
jurisdiction over those counts seeking to deny Sharif a discharge, including the
count concerning concealment of the Soad Wattar Trust assets (as property of
the debtor or property of the estate) under Code § 727(a)(2). Indeed, in the
Seventh Circuit, Sharif conceded and the court agreed “that the bankruptcy
court had authority to enter final judgment” on the discharge-denial counts, 365
and thus, the Seventh Circuit “affirm[ed] the bankruptcy court’s entry of
default judgment denying discharge of Sharif’s debts.” 366 Of course, Sharif’s
alleged concealment of the Soad Wattar Trust assets would be grounds for
denial of discharge under Code § 727(a)(2) only if those assets were, in fact,
“property of the debtor” or “property of the estate.” 367
Again, because the jurisdictional objection was not raised before the
bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy judge did not make the requisite findings. It

363

11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)–(5) (2012).
Id. § 727(a)(2)(A)–(B); see supra Part III.A.2.a.
365 Wellness, 727 F.3d at 773.
366 Id. at 782. As Chief Justice Roberts correctly noted in Wellness, “[w]hen the Framers gathered to draft
the Constitution, English statutes had long empowered nonjudicial bankruptcy ‘commissioners’ to,” inter alia,
“discharge the debts” of the bankrupt. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1951 (2015)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 153, at *482–83; Plank, supra note 156, at 576,
589–90, 612; Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 325, 333–34, 340 & n.96, 342 (1991). As Professor Plank’s research reveals, commissioners “determined
almost all of the issues arising in the bankruptcy proceeding,” including “discharge of the bankrupt’s debts.”
Plank, supra note 156, at 576. And as Professor Tabb has observed, “[w]hether or not to issue the certificate
[of conformity, which was later called the certificate of discharge] was considered a judicial act within the
discretion of the commissioners.” Tabb, supra, at 334.
367 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A)–(B).
364
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is certainly plausible, though, that had the jurisdictional objection been raised
before the bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy judge would have concluded that
she was resolving the alter-ego claim in order to finally adjudicate a core
§ 727(a)(2) discharge objection premised upon the Soad Wattar Trust assets
being property of the debtor or property of the estate and, thus, that she also
had supplemental core jurisdiction to finally adjudicate the alter-ego claim. 368
As I have argued before, 369 even in the absence of any other basis for core
jurisdiction, such an exercise of supplemental core jurisdiction is fully
consistent with the Katchen and Stern decisions.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s Wellness decision has important implications for the
constitutionality of non-Article III adjudications in the context of both
bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy adjudicatory systems, whether those nonArticle III adjudications are conducted with or without consent of the litigants.
In the nonbankruptcy context, Wellness reveals a Supreme Court jurisprudence
with a bifurcated analytical methodology that facilitates a complex interaction
between the waivable personal and non-waivable structural interests protected
by Article III, § 1. In the bankruptcy context, Wellness provides further
evidence that the Court is, over a long run of decisions, simply confirming the
constitutional significance of its extensive summary-plenary jurisprudence as
the operative constitutional constraint on the adjudicatory powers of nonArticle III bankruptcy judges.

368 The Stern Court’s own statement of the holding of the case, as applied to a general principle of
supplemental core jurisdiction, is that a bankruptcy judge “lack[s] the constitutional authority to enter a final
judgment on” a supplemental claim, such as the counterclaim at issue in Stern, only to the extent that a
particular issue of fact or law “is not resolved in the process of ruling on” a constitutionally core claim, such as
a creditor’s claim against the estate. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011) (emphasis added); see also
Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 333 n.9 (1966) (reserving judgment as to whether a referee had jurisdiction to
determine (by final order) factual or legal issues regarding an otherwise-plenary claim “which have not been
disposed of in passing on” a summary matter (emphasis added)).
369 See Brubaker, A “Summary” Theory, supra note 2, at 167–72, 176–80.

